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Abstract
Currently, financial economics is unable to predict changes in asset prices with respect
to changes in the underlying risk factors, even when an asset’s dividend is independent
of a given factor. This paper takes steps towards addressing this issue by highlighting
a crucial component of wealth effects on asset prices hitherto ignored by the literature.
Changes in wealth do not only alter an agent’s risk aversion, but also her perceived
“riskiness” of a security. The latter enhances significantly the extent to which market-
clearing leads to endogenously-generated correlation across asset prices, over and above
that induced by correlation between payoffs, giving the appearance of “contagion.”
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1 Introduction
Whether or not and exactly how the prices of different assets are related to one another is
of fundamental importance in financial economics. During the 2008 crisis, for instance, one
of the most pressing questions was whether emerging markets’ securities would be able to
shield investors from the losses of western banking stocks, associated with the US subprime
debacle. Alas, at the moment, financial economic theory cannot really answer this at any
significant extent of generality. For it has not studied yet analytically and in a general
model how the equilibrium price of a given asset depends upon the individual risk factors
that contribute to the dividend of another asset. In fact, it has not done so even for the
limiting case in which the two dividend processes are independent. Of course, there is an
extensive literature that attempts to study such relations using specific models, simulations,
or empirical methods, but it lacks the rigorousness of general theoretical analysis.
The present paper makes steps towards filling this gap. Using the theoretical back-
drop of representative agent general equilibrium asset-pricing, it conducts a comparative
statics analysis of the price of the typical security with respect to the current realization
of the typical underlying risk factor. As it turns out, market-clearing generically leads to
endogenously-generated correlations across asset prices, over and above those induced by
correlations between the respective dividends. Given this, an obvious aim of study is to
determine the direction of asset-price movements, especially when the security’s dividend
is independent of the given risk factor.
We refer to this situation as “contagion” and show that it may or may not be detrimental
for a risk-averse investor.1 We identify fairly general settings of economic primitives under
which asset prices in emerging markets would fall in the aftermath of the 2008 crisis, even
though their dividends do not depend at all upon shocks in the US housing sector (see
Propositions 2, 6, and 10). We also find settings, however, under which these asset prices
would increase, so that contagion would provide a means for diversification (see Propositions
3, 7, and 11 but also Propositions 2, 6, and 10 under IARA).
As is well-known, in a representative-agent financial equilibrium, the price of the typical
security is the current expectation of its future dividends valued at the agent’s marginal
rate of substitution between consumption at the dividend-collection date and the present.
This asset-pricing framework has been used extensively in the literature but the dynamics
1The literature on contagion has focused mostly on the propagation of shocks across national or regional
stock markets. One of its peculiarities is that, although there is fairly widespread agreement about the
contagion events themselves, there is no consensus on exactly what constitutes contagion or how it should
be defined. One preferred definition is the propagation of shocks in excess of that which can be explained
by fundamentals. Another (often referred to as “shift-contagion”) looks for changes in how shocks are
propagated between normal and crisis periods. Yet another labels contagion the transmission of shocks
through specific channels, such as herding or irrational investor behavior. And an even broader definition
identifies contagion as any linkage mechanism that causes markets or asset prices to move together. The
main reason for this prolificness is that each definition seems to run in its own difficulties when it comes to
empirical identification. My focus being strictly theoretical, I will be referring to contagion having in mind
the first definition.
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of the equilibrium pricing process with respect to the underlying risk process have not been
thus far investigated - not analytically and, hence, not to a satisfactory degree of generality
with respect to the economic primitives. In the sequel, we identify three different effects
the current realization of a given risk factor may have upon the equilibrium price of a given
security.
The first two effects are well-known. Other things being equal, an increase in the
current realization of a risk factor raises the expected dividend if the latter is positively
correlated with the former. This is an improvement in first-order stochastic dominance
terms which, due to her non-satiation, renders the representative agent more willing to
hold the corresponding security. Given fixed net supply, this exerts upwards pressure on
the security’s equilibrium price, giving rise to the dividend effect. Yet, the increase in
the expected dividend raises also the agent’s expected wealth. Due to her risk-aversion,
this reduces the expected marginal utility of wealth, exerting downward pressure on the
security’s price. This is the risk-aversion effect, responsible for the fact that the price of a
security need not increase when its dividend increases.
However, changes in the realization of the risk factor are related to the security’s price
also via the correlation between the dividend and the marginal utility of wealth. This is
the asset-riskiness effect and may well be the main driver of contagion in asset prices. As
shown in Section 3, there are settings in which, following an increase in the agent’s wealth,
the corresponding decrease in its marginal utility is small when the dividend realization is
large and vice versa. That is, the dividend becomes less positively correlated with wealth
and the agent perceives the security as less “risky.” As a result, she demands more of it
and, in the face of fixed net supply, pushes up the security’s equilibrium price.
Of course, marginal utilities are not observable in practice and securities are priced with
respect to a numeraire so that what really matters is the relative price between two securi-
ties. To study analytically the comparative statics of the typical relative price, we restrict
attention to a pure exchange economy in which the the typical dividend is proportional to a
geometric Brownian motion. This specification has been used widely in theoretical as well
as empirical studies because it allows the equilibrium asset prices to be identified either in
closed form or as solutions to well-known stochastic differential equations.
Yet, describing their evolution with respect to the typical underlying risk factor, the
typical standard Brownian motion, is not straightforward. In fact, despite the absence of
jumps, extreme events or other irregularities in the underlying risk process, the relative price
dynamics are rich and complex. The present analysis attests to the richness by establishing
that, as a norm, the typical relative price will be correlated with the typical Brownian
factor. When the relative dividend is correlated with the Brownian factor, the relative price
varies always monotonically (see Propositions 1, 5, and 9). However, the relative price will
be correlated with the factor even when the relative dividend is independent of that factor.
Section 4 attests to the complexity of the underlying dynamics by indicating how difficult
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it is to pin down settings in which the sign of this correlation is identifiable.
More precisely, we identify conditions on the factor loadings of the geometric Brownian
motions and on the agent’s endowment process so that a given relative price will vary
monotonically with the realization of a given Brownian motion. This allows us to sign
each and every entry in the dispersion matrix of relative prices, even when none of the
two dividends is correlated with the Brownian motion. When the representative agent
exhibits decreasing absolute risk aversion (DARA), the monotone relation is positive (see
Propositions 2, 6, and 10). And it obtains even under the setting in which all dividends
in the model are independent of one another while the agent’s endowment is deterministic
- admittedly, the most inhospitable economic environment for cross-correlations in asset
prices.
By contrast, under increasing (IARA) or constant (CARA) absolute risk aversion, the
monotone relation is negative (see Propositions 3, 7, and 11). This contradicts the rather
widely-held view that, under CARA, changes in the agent’s wealth should not matter for
the relative prices. For it establishes that the typical relative price will not respond to
a Brownian realization which does not affect either dividend, irrespectively of the speci-
fications for the dividend and endowment processes, if and only if the Brownian motion
in question and those correlated with the two dividends affect the agent’s wealth through
independent channels (see Propositions 4, 8, and 12).
Needless to say, the possibility for correlation in asset prices when there is no common
factor in cash flows is well-known. But it has not been demonstrated before analytically in
a general equilibrium model.2 And this is important because the very presence of contagion
renders general equilibrium a sine qva non approach towards understanding asset-price dy-
namics. To this end, restricting attention to the representative agent and the monotonicity
of her risk aversion coefficient (rather than a particular utility specification) allows for lim-
ited loss of generality.3 More importantly perhaps, the investigation being analytical not
only facilitates economic intuition but also highlights that the direction of contagion depends
fundamentally on the assumed specification for the dividend and endowment processes as
2Contagion is noted, for example, in Raimondo [62] as well as Anderson and Raimondo [6] but no
formula is given for the cross-derivative. Kodres and Pritsker [43], Kyle and Xiong [44], but also Lagunoff
and Schreft [45] show that contagion can obtain as a wealth effect in rational expectations equilibria. These
are not general equilibrium models, however, as some market participants are not rational (the former two
models require the presence of noise traders, the latter of irrational ones). Contagion equilibria arise as
well in Aliprantis et al. [1] within the context of a monetary model where players engage in strategic, non
price-taking behavior.
3In fact, our analysis carries through for a general pricing kernel as long as this can be a function of the
economy’s total wealth. The latter restriction imposes no loss of generality when the financial market under
study is dynamically complete (which, for the informational and trading structures under study here, has
been characterized by Diasakos [23]). In this case, the coefficient of risk tolerance of the representative agent
is the sum of the individual ones (see, for instance, Theorem 4 in Wilson [68]). For the representative agent to
exhibit DARA (IARA), therefore, it suffices that the coefficient of absolute risk aversion of each individual
is non-increasing (non-decreasing) with at least one individual exhibiting DARA (IARA). Similarly, the
representative agent will exhibit CARA if every individual in the economy does so. By contrast, she will not
exhibit for example CRRA unless all individuals are identical regarding preferences as well as endowments.
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well as on the representative agent’s attitudes towards risk.
On the empirical side, the literature finds contagion to be pervasive.4 There is also
ample evidence that conditional correlations across asset prices and returns are stochastic,
and of a magnitude that cannot be explained by covariances between their respective payoffs
alone.5 With respect to such findings, the present analysis provides theoretical justification
for excess asset-price comovements within the context of general equilibrium asset-pricing.
In fact, by assuming constant covariances between asset payoffs, it indicates that such
comovements ought to be generic phenomena, even when due to market-clearing alone.
Regarding the asset-price dynamics per se, the studies that are closest to the present
are Cochrane et al. [18] and Martin [49]. Both papers investigate a pure-exchange, infinite-
horizon, representative-agent economy. In Cochrane et al. [18], the agent has log-utility for
instantaneous consumption and access to the dividend stream of at most two Lucas trees,
each following a geometric Brownian motion. The paper provides closed-form solutions for
a large collection of variables of interest (asset-prices, expected returns, market-betas, and
return correlations), but they are given with respect to the dividend-share (the share of
total output due to a tree’s dividend) rather than the underlying Brownian process, while
the corresponding dynamics are examined numerically rather than analytically. In fact, the
solution method depends fundamentally upon the dividend-share being the unique state
variable, in a way that makes it applicable only to log-utility and at most two trees. By
contrast, Martin’s [49] approach extends to power utility and many trees, whose dividend
streams may follow geometric Brownian motions with normally-distributed jumps. This
paper offers also closed-form solutions for absolute prices, expected returns, and bond-
yields, but again in terms of a state-vector which is not the underlying stochastic process
(it depicts instead the relative sizes of the dividends), while the corresponding dynamics
are investigated again through calibrations.
Both papers draw attention to the fact that there is significant price comovement even
between assets whose dividends are independent. In the case of two trees, when one has
a positive dividend shock, its dividend becomes a larger share of a now larger total con-
sumption. As a result, investors want to rebalance by spreading some of their larger wealth
across both trees. Yet, in the face of fixed net supply, they cannot collectively rebalance,
so asset prices must adjust. Typically, the price of the tree with the positive shock rises
whereas the risk premium of the other falls. And the latter can happen only via an increase
in the price of the second asset if the two dividend streams are independent. Indeed, being
4See, for instance, Shiller [66] or Forbes and Rigobon [30] regarding contagion across national or regional
stock markets. Gropp and Moerman [35] identify within-country contagion among large European bank
stocks while Pindyck and Rotemberg [61] find evidence of excess correlation in asset price comovements.
5Moskowitz [54] finds evidence that risk-premia are better represented by covariances with the implied
market portfolio than by own-variances. Andersen and Lund [4], on the other hand, suggest that U.S. risk-
free short-term interest rates can be consistently estimated as stochastic-volatility diffusions. On stochastic
second moments of returns, see also Andersen et al. [3]-[2], Longin and Solnik [46] or Schwert and Seguin
[64].
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now a smaller part of total consumption means that the second asset becomes less positively
correlated with consumption, inducing investors to demand more of it and, thus, force its
price to rise.
In both papers, however, this is what happens typically, not always, which is most
evident when the second asset is a zero-coupon bond.6 Given its smaller dividend-share, it
is still true that investors want to spread their larger wealth across both trees, which should
raise the price of the bond. Alas, the interest rate also changes and this may more than offset
the rebalancing desire (see Figure 9 in Cochrane et al. [18]). Yet, as shown by the present
analytical approach, this ambiguity in the characterization of asset-price dynamics can be
eliminated. Both papers attempt to relate a given asset price to the current realization of a
given dimension of the underlying risk process via a state-variable, be it the dividend-share
or the relative size of the dividends, whose own change cannot be isolated to come from
that dimension alone. By contrast, we look at asset-price dynamics with respect to the
underlying risk process directly. As it turns out, there are settings of economic primitives
under which the results are not ambiguous at all. In fact, for the two-assets example above,
this is true not only when the representative agent exhibits constant relative risk aversion
(CRRA) but more generally DARA (see Proposition 6).
The remainder of the paper evolves as follows. The next section describes the model
under study and its relation to the pertinent literature. Section 3 investigates the com-
parative statics of equilibrium relative prices under the benchmark scenario for illustrative
purposes: when the time horizon is finite and the securities pay only lump-sum dividends on
the terminal date. Section 4 identifies specific settings of economic primitives under which
contagion dynamics can be unambiguously foretold. Section 5 extends the analysis to the
case in which the securities pay also dividend flows during the trading interval while the
horizon may be infinite. Section 6 concludes while the Appendix contains the proofs and
supporting technical material.
2 Setup and Related Literature
In a financial market where trading occurs over a time-interval T ⊆ R+ and the informa-
tional structure is given by a standard Brownian motion, well-known no-arbitrage conditions
ensure that the securities’ prices are the current expectations of their future dividends val-
ued at some pricing kernel, a strictly-positive one-dimensional Ito process. In what follows,
the underlying standard Brownian process will be K-dimensional (K ∈ N∗), defined on a
complete probability space (Ω,F , µ), and depicted as β : Ω× T 7→ RK or βk : Ω× T 7→ R
with k ∈ K = {1, . . . ,K} for the typical dimension.As usual, this is meant to fully de-
6Indeed, the relation between an asset’s risk-premium and the dividend-share does not depend only on
the “cash-flow beta” intuition given above. It depends also on “valuation-beta,” the tendency of the price-
dividend ratio to change with the market and, thus, total consumption. And this relation is not always
positive. There are ranges of dividend-share values where the price of the second asset falls in the given
example (see Figure 3 in Cochrane et al. [18] and Figure 7(a) in Martin [49]).
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scribe the exogenous financial risk in the sense that the collection of the sample paths
{β (ω, t) : t ∈ [0, T ]}ω∈Ω specifies all the distinguishable events.
The trading structure will consist of N + 1 securities (N ∈ N), indexed by n ∈ N =
{0, . . . , N}, which are traded continuously over T . The public informational endowment
will be taken to be the filtration {Ft : t ∈ T } that is generated by β. Hence, the dividend
process of each security will be a function of the process I = {t, β (ω, t)}(ω,t)∈Ω×T , which
is adapted to the given filtration. It will be instructive, moreover, to distinguish between
two different forms the dividend process may take. Along the Brownian path {β (ω, t)}t∈T ,
the typical security may be paying the dividend flow gn (I (ω, ·)) while, if the time-horizon
is finite (T = [0, T ] for some T ∈ R++), also the lump sum Gn (I (ω, T )) on the terminal
date. Then, the current price of the typical security is given by
Pn (I (ω, t)) = Eµ
u′ (W (I (ω, T )))Gj (I (ω, T ))
u˜′
(
W˜ (I (ω, t))
) |Ft
 (1)
+ Eµ
∫ T
t
u˜′
(
W˜ (I (ω, s))
)
gj (I (ω, s))
u˜′
(
W˜ (I (ω, t))
) ds|Ft

taking the representative agent as having von-Neumann Morgenstern utility functions u˜, u :
R++ 7→ R, which are both twice continuously-differentiable, strictly-increasing, and concave
everywhere in their respective instantaneous wealth domains:
W˜ (I (ω, t)) = ρ˜ (I (ω, t)) +
N∑
n=0
gn (I (ω, t))
W (I (ω, T )) = ρ (I (ω, T )) +
N∑
n=0
Gn (I (ω, T ))
with ρ˜ : Ω × T 7→ R+ and ρ : Ω × {T} 7→ R+ being continuous endowment functions and
under the proviso that, in the infinite-horizon case (T = R++), only the second term on
the right-hand side above applies (with T =∞).
The essential premise that lies underneath the asset-pricing equation above (and, thus,
also behind the analysis that follows) is that utilities, dividends, endowments, and wealth
are allowed to be time- as well as state-dependent, as long as this obtains through the
realizations of the process I (·). As an approach towards equilibrium asset-pricing theory,
this has been the building block for much of the seminal literature. The starting point has
been to assume that agents have identical preferences. This has been the launching pad of
two related strands of the literature. The first restricts attention to what is essentially the
continuous-time analogue of the static (one-period) model: the setting in which the time-
horizon is finite and securities pay only lump-sum dividends on the terminal date. The
resulting asset-pricing process is given by the first term on the right-hand side of (1) - as in,
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for example, Bick [9]-[10], He and Leland [37], Raimondo [62], or Anderson and Raimondo
[6].
The second approach has been to allow for securities that pay also dividend flows during
the time interval while the time-horizon may be infinite. Perhaps the most well-known paper
in this strand is Cox et al. [20], the continuous-time analogue of the famous model in Lucas
[47], enhanced to include production.7 In Cox et al. [20], the asset-pricing formula takes
the same form as (1), which can be found also in Cochrane et al. [18], Martin [49], Merton
[51]-[52], or Wang [67] (whose pricing formula derives actually from Example 3 in Duffie
and Skiadas [24]).
Even when the economy consists of agents with heterogenous preferences, the pricing
kernel remains a linear function of the equilibrium marginal utilities (the Negishi weights
are constant) if the equilibrium allocation is Pareto-optimal (i.e., the market is effectively
complete). And again, also in this case, the pricing formula retains the same basic form
as in (1) - see, for instance, Anderson and Raimondo [5], Hugonnier et al. [39], Basak and
Cuoco [8], Duffie and Zame [25] (see Theorem 1 and the subsequent discussion in Section
5), Dumas [22], Karatzas et al. [42] (see Corollary 10.4), or Riedel [63] (see Theorem 2.1).
Clearly, in the context of financial equilibrium, the pricing process under consideration here
is general, at least as long as the financial market is effectively complete.8
Of course, in an equilibrium model, one must choose also a numeraire. Yet, since the
underlying informational structure is a filtration, the choice of numeraire here is essentially
arbitrary because the equilibrium market-clearing condition will depend only on the relative
prices of the traded entities, and will do so node (ω, t) by node (ω, s), for s 6= t.As a
consequence, it is without loss of generality to normalize such that the price of one of the
traded entities (typically, one of the commodities) is 1 at all (ω, t) ∈ Ω× T .
It is also typical in continuous-time models to assume that one of the traded securities
(say the zeroth one) is a money-market account, an instantaneously risk-free asset. Alas,
as emphasized in Anderson and Raimondo [5], this is an endogenous assumption because
it restricts directly the market value of this security. Instead, to render the zeroth security
7Allowing for time- but not state-dependent preferences, the representative agent of Cox et al. [20]
seeks to maximize the current expectation of the future utility flow, Eµ
[∫ T
t
u˜ (W (I (ω, s)) , s) ds|Ft
]
and
the equilibrium relative price of any real asset will be given by the second term in (1). I am referring to the
last term of equation (38) in Cox et al. [20]. This term prices real assets, claims that pay δ (W (s) , Y (s) , s)
units of consumption at time s when the realization of the stochastic process is Y (s). By contrast, the first
two terms allow for the pricing of general financial assets, including options and futures. These are claims
that pay Θ (W (τ) , Y (τ)) if some underlying variables do not leave a certain region before the maturity
date τ and Ψ (W (s) , Y (s) , s) every time s they do, otherwise. Notice that J (W (s) , Y (s) , s) is the agent’s
equilibrium indirect utility at time s, given the realization Y (s). It depends on the date s and the state
variable Y as the authors allow for the direct utility to be time- and state-dependent. As I establish in the
sequel, all of my results remain valid in the face of the former dependence. The latter is beyond my current
scope.
8In fact, regarding the dividend specification the present paper will examine, [23] shows that, as long
as the dispersion matrix of the securities’ dividends is non-degenerate, the market will meet the stronger
condition of dynamic completeness.
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instantaneously risk-free, one can simply divide all prices in the model by that of the zeroth
security. When one does so, it is now the price of the latter security that is 1 at all
(ω, t) ∈ Ω × T and, most importantly, this is without any loss of generality (see Anderson
and Raimondo [5] for a more detailed discussion).
What matter then are the relative prices of the remaining securities, the typical one
being
pn (I (ω, t)) = Pn (I (ω, t))
P0 (I (ω, t)) n ∈ N \ {0}
Hence, in what follows, our focus will be on the derivative of the typical relative price with
respect to changes in the current realization of the typical Brownian component:
∂pn (I (ω, t))
∂βk (ω, t)
=
∂Pn(I(ω,t))
∂βk(ω,t)
− pn (I (ω, t)) ∂P0(I(ω,t))∂βk(ω,t)
P0 (I (ω, t)) (n, k) ∈ N \ {0} × K (2)
Needless to say, these relative price dynamics cannot be readily identified from the infor-
mation process available in the economy. To be able to examine them analytically, I will
restrict attention to the dividend processes9
gn (I (ω, t)) = an (t) eσ˜
⊺
nβ(ω,t) (3)
Gn (I (ω, T )) = An (T ) eσ
⊺
nβ(ω,T ) (4)
where an, An : T 7→ R++ are deterministic supply functions while the instantaneous disper-
sion vectors σn, σ˜n ∈ RK are constant.
Here, the typical terminal dividend is proportional to aK-dimensional geometric Brown-
ian motion as long as σn 6= 0 and An (t) = ξ (t) eµnt for some µn ∈ R∗ and some deterministic
supply function ξ : [0, T ] 7→ R++ (with
∫ T
0 ξ (s) ds < ∞). By contrast, σn = 0 renders the
dividend riskless. It may be now a money-market account if An (t) = e
∫ t
0 µn(s)ds for some
deterministic function µn : [0, T ] 7→ R++ (with
∫ T
0 µn (s) ds < ∞) or a zero-coupon bond
if An (t) = 1 on [0, T ]. Similarly, the typical intermediate dividend is proportional to a K-
dimensional geometric Brownian motion if σ˜n 6= 0 and an (t) = ξ˜ (t) eµ˜nt for some µ˜n ∈ R∗
and some function ξ˜ : T 7→ R++ (with
∫
T
ξ˜ (s) ds <∞). When σn = 0, on the other hand,
9Let dY = µdt + Σdβ be an N -dimensional Ito process and V ⊆ RN an open set such that Y (ω, t) ∈
V ∀ (ω, t) ∈ Ω × [0, T ] almost surely. Consider now a twice-differentiable function f : V 7→ R (such
as any price in the model). By Ito’s lemma, and not displaying the dependence upon (ω, t), df (Y ) =[
fY (Y )µ+
1
2
tr (Σ⊺fY Y (Y ) Σ)
]
dt + fY (Y ) Σdβ where fY =
(
∂f
∂Y1
, . . . , ∂f
∂YN
)
and fY Y =
(
∂2f
∂Yi∂Yj
)N
i,j=1
denote the gradient vector (in row form) and the Hessian matrix of f , respectively. If one fixes time,
the sensitivity of f with respect to changes in the realization of the underlying risk factors is given by
df (Y ) =
∑N
n=1
∑K
k=1
∂f(Y )
∂Yn
σnkdβk. In particular, restricting attention to changes in the kth risk source only,
∂f(Y )
∂βk
= σ⊺kfY (Y ) where σk is the kth column of Σ. In our case, we have d lnGn =
(
µn − σ
⊺
nσn
2
)
dt+ σ⊺ndβ
so that the sensitivity of pn is given by dpn (X) =
∑N
n=1
∑K
k=1
∂pn(X)
∂Xn
σnkdβk. That is,
∂pn(X)
∂βk
= σ⊺kpnX (X)
where σk is the kth column of the N ×K matrix whose typical row is σ⊺n.
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the dividend may be a money-market account, if an (t) = e
∫ t
0 µ˜n(s)ds for some deterministic
function µ˜n : T 7→ R++ (with
∫
T
µ˜n (s) ds <∞) or an annuity if an (t) = 1 on T .
As dividend specification, this has been the main building block of the theoretical (see,
for instance, Bick [10], Cochrane et al. [18], Constandinides and Zariphopoulou [19], Merton
[51]-[52], Oksendal and Sulem [55], Raimondo [62], or Anderson and Raimondo [6]) as well as
applied finance literature (see Martens and van Dijk [48], Wong [69], Instefjord [41], Gerber
and Shiu [32]-[33], Gatheral and Schied [31], Browne [12], Biger and Hull [11]). Recently,
moreover, it has started featuring prominently also in applied macro- and micro-economic
studies (see Postali and Picchetti [58], Farhi and Panageas [28],Epaulard and Pommeret [26],
Hadjiliadis [36], Hull [40], He [38], Candenillas and Zapatero [13], Capozza and Kazarian
[14], Ericsson [27], Mella-Baral and Perraudin [50], Oren [56], Pennings [57], Promislow and
Young [59], Maratha and Ryan [60], Schmidli [65], Milevsky [53], Fleten et al. [29], Deng
et al. [21], Carey and Zilberman [15]).
3 Price Dynamics with Lump-sum Dividends
To fix ideas and facilitate intuitive reasoning, let us begin by considering a finite time-
horizon (T = [0, T ] for some T ∈ R++) and assuming that the securities pay only lump-sum
dividends on the terminal date. That is, the dividend process of every security n ∈ N is
given by (4) while gn (·) = 0 a.e. on Ω × [0, T ]. In this case, only the first term on the
right-hand side of (1) applies (as in, for example, Bick [9]-[10], Anderson and Raimondo
[6], Raimondo [62], He and Leland [37]). Letting then β (ω, T ) − β (ω, t) = √T − tx with
x ∼ N (0, IK), we may write
Pn (I (ω, t)) = Covx
[
u′ (W (T, I (ω, t) ,x)) , Gn (T, I (t) ,x)
]
(5)
+ Ex
[
u′ (W (T, I (ω, t) ,x))]Ex [Gn (T, I (ω, t) ,x)]
∂Pn (I (ω, t))
∂βk (ω, t)
=
∂Covx [u
′ (W (T, I (ω, t) ,x)) , Gn (T, I (t) ,x)]
∂βk (ω, t)
(6)
+ Ex [Gn (W (T, I (ω, t) ,x))]Ex
[
∂u′ (W (T, I (ω, t) ,x))
∂βk (ω, t)
]
+ Ex
[
u′ (W (T, I (ω, t) ,x))]Ex [∂Gn (T, I (ω, t) ,x)
∂βk (ω, t)
]
3.1 The Dividend and Risk-Aversion Effects
Other things remaining equal, a change dβk (ω, t) in the kth component of β (ω, t) al-
ters by σnkdβk (ω, t) the Ft-conditional drift, µnT + σ⊺nβ (ω, t), of the underlying stochas-
tic process that determines the dividend.10 Its Ft-conditional expectation changes by
10“Other things remaining equal” (or similar expressions) refer henceforth to the current realizations of
the remaining K − 1 sources of uncertainty, {βm (ω, t)}m∈{1,...,K}\{k}.
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σnkEx [Gn (T, I (ω, t) ,x)] dβk (ω, t). Suppose now that βk (ω, t) increases. If σnk > 0 (σnk <
0), the currently expected dividend will be higher (lower). Due to non-satiation (u′ (·) > 0),
this increases (decreases) the willingness of the representative agent to hold the nth security.
As she must, however, continue to hold the net supply in equilibrium, the security’s price
must rise (fall). It does so by σnkEx [u
′ (W (T, I (ω, t) ,x))]Ex [Gn (T, I (ω, t) ,x)] dβk (ω, t),
which is the change in the expected dividend measured in terms of marginal utility. This is
the dividend effect of dβk (ω, t) on the typical equilibrium price, depicted by the third term
on the right-hand side of (6).
Of course, for any realization
√
T − tx, dβk (ω, t) reveals information that alters by
σn′kEx [Gn′ (T, I (ω, t) ,x)] dβk (ω, t) the expected dividend of any security n′ ∈ N . These
changes along with dρ (T, I (ω, t) ,x), the change in the terminal-period endowment, give
the corresponding change in the Ft-conditional terminal-period wealth. Ceteris paribus,
the representative agent’s risk aversion (u′′ (·) < 0) induces an opposite change in marginal
utility and, thus, also in the equilibrium prices. The risk-aversion effect of dβk (ω, t) on the
absolute price of the typical security is given by the second term on the right-hand side of
(6). Needless to say, the direction of this effect is the same for each and every security in
the model.11
3.2 The Asset-Riskiness Effect
Given
√
T − tx, the extent to which dβk (ω, t) alters a security’s price by changing the
marginal utility of terminal wealth depends on the future realization of the security’s div-
idend. Similarly, the extent to which dβk (ω, t) alters a security’s price via a change in
its dividend depends on the marginal utility of the future realization of wealth. Which is
to say that changes in βk (ω, t) affect the equilibrium price of the typical security through
changes in the correlation between its dividend and the marginal utility of wealth. This is
the asset-riskiness effect of dβk (ω, t) on the typical equilibrium price, depicted by the first
term on the right-hand side of equation (6).
To investigate this effect formally, we will deploy the following notation. For an arbitrary
(n, k) ∈ N ×K, let
Kn = {k ∈ K : σnk 6= 0} and Nm = {n ∈ N : σnm 6= 0}
be, respectively, the collection of Brownian components that are correlated with the nth
dividend and that of the dividends that are correlated with the mth Brownian component.
We will also adopt the convention that, if there is a security with riskless dividend, it will
be designated as the zero one. Given this and to avoid redundancies, assume that Nm 6= ∅
11Equally obviously, between any two securities, the relative magnitude of the risk-aversion effect is pre-
cisely the ratio of their currently-expected terminal dividends. Indeed, the latter is nothing but the propor-
tionality constant needed to convert units of one security into units of the other, in terms of Ft-conditional
expected terminal wealth.
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∀m ∈ K and Kn 6= ∅ ∀n ∈ N \ {0} with σn 6= σn′ for any two different n, n′ ∈ N . It will
be instructive also to define
NM =
{
n′ ∈ N : ∃m ∈ Kn, σn′m 6= 0
}
where M = |Kn| < K.
An example when identification is straightforward
To understand the mechanics of the asset-riskiness effect, it is instructive to consider a
setting in which the kth Brownian component is not correlated with the nth dividend
(k 6∈ Kn) while those components that are correlated with this dividend (βm (ω, t) with
m ∈ Kn) affect the terminal wealth (i) only through dividends (∂ρ(I(ω,T ))∂βm(ω,T ) = 0 if m ∈ Kn),
and (ii) through dividends that are not correlated with the remainder of the Brownian
process (Kn ∩Kn′ 6= ∅ only if Kn′ ⊆ Kn). That is, consider the wealth specification12
W (T, I (ω, t) ,x) = ρ (T, I (ω, t) ,y)
+
∑
n′′∈N\NM
Gn′ (T, I (ω, t) ,y) +
∑
n′∈NM
Gn′ (T, I (ω, t) , z)
:= W−M (T, I (ω, t) ,y) +WM (T, I (ω, t) , z) (7)
where x = (z,y) ∼ N
(
0,
[
IM OM×(K−M)
O
⊺ IK−M
])
.
In this case,
∂W (T,I(ω,t),x)
∂βk(ω,t)
=
∂W−M (T,I(ω,t),z)
∂βk(ω,t)
so that the first term on the right-hand
side of (6) can be written out as follows
Covx
[
u′′ (W (T, I (ω, t) , (z,y))) ∂W−M (T, I (ω, t) ,y)
∂βk (ω, t)
, Gn (T, I (ω, t) , z)
]
=
∫
RK−M
( ∫
RM
u′′ (W (T, I (ω, t) , (z,y)))Gn (T, I (ω, t) , z) dΦ (z)−∫
RM
u′′ (W (T, I (ω, t) , (z,y))) dΦ (z) ∫
RM
Gn (T, I (ω, t) , z) dΦ (z)
)
×∂W−M (T, I (ω, t) ,y)
∂βk (ω, t)
dΦ (y) (8)
=
∫
RK−M
Covz
[
u′′ (W (T, I (ω, t) , (z,y))) , Gn (T, I (ω, t) , z)
] ∂W−M (T, I (ω, t) ,y)
∂βk (ω, t)
dΦ (y)
In this setting, conditional on the realization y, the terminal wealthW (·) is strictly comono-
tonic in z with Gn (·). Under non-increasing absolute risk aversion (NIARA), so is u′′ (·)
which implies in turn that the covariance within the last integral above is strictly positive
(see Appendix B).13 Clearly, the sign of the asset-riskiness effect of dβk (ω, t) on Pn (ω, t)
12It is without loss of generality to take the first M indices in K to be the set Kn \ {k}. In what
follows, xM ∈ RM depicts the realizations of the Brownian increments {βm (T )− βm (t)}m∈{1,...,M}, while
x−M ∈ RK−M will refer to those of the increments {βk (T )− βk (t)}k∈{M+1,...,K}, and x−(M,k) ∈ RK−M−1
to the realizations of {βk′ (T )− βk′ (t)}k′∈{M+1,...,K}\{k}.
13The coefficient of absolute risk-aversion is the function rA : R+ → R++ defined by rA (·) = −u′′ (·) /u′ (·).
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will be given by the sign of
∂W−M (T,I(ω,t),y)
∂βk(ω,t)
, as long as this sign remains unchanged on
R
K−M .
To see why this ought to be so, let for instance
∂W−M (T,I(ω,t),y)
∂βk(ω,t)
> 0 ∀y ∈ RK−M . Then,
an increase in βk (ω, t) raises the Ft-conditional terminal wealth, reducing its marginal
utility. Under NIARA, though, the decrease in the marginal utility is smaller when the
nth dividend is large and larger when it is small. And, due to risk aversion, this means
that the increase in βk (ω, t) makes the terminal wealth less positively correlated with the
nth dividend. This diminishes the representative agent’s perceived “riskiness” of the nth
security, inducing her to demand more of it and (in the face of fixed supply) raise its price
in equilibrium. Observe also that the risk-aversion effect of dβk (ω, t) on Pn (ω, t) will have
the opposite sign of
∂W−M (T,I(ω,t),y)
∂βk(ω,t)
. In this example, the asset-riskness and risk-aversion
effects push the security’s price in opposite directions.
An example when it is not
The preceding illustration relies heavily on the fact that the kth Brownian component is
not correlated with the nth dividend. By contrast, when σnk 6= 0, the mechanics of the
asset-riskness effect become more complicated. Given a change dβk (ω, t), the new wealth
realization will be W (T, I (ω, t) ,x) + dW (T, I (ω, t) ,x) while the new covariance of its
marginal utility with the dividend will be given by
eσnkdβk(ω,t)Covx
[
u′ (W (T, I (ω, t) ,x) + dW (T, I (ω, t) ,x)) , Gn (T, I (ω, t) ,x)
]
Obviously, what happens to the perceived “riskness” of the security is determined now not
only by the covariance above, but also by the term eσnkdβk(ω,t).
Suppose, for example, that W (T, I (ω, t) ,x) and Gn (T, I (ω, t) ,x) are again strictly
comonotonic in x. As before, u′ (·) is strictly countermonotonic and, thus, negatively corre-
lated with the dividend. Let, however, σnkdβk (ω, t) > 0 so that we have the drift of the nth
dividend is now higher. Even though the change in terminal wealth renders its marginal
utility less negatively correlated with the nth dividend, as eσnkdβk(ω,t) > 1, the increase
in the latter’s drift might be sufficient to make their covariance more negative overall. In
this case, and in sharp contrast to the preceding example, the perceived “riskiness” of the
nth security increases with βk (ω, t), exerting a downward pressure on its equilibrium price.
The asset-riskness and risk-aversion effects push now the price in the same direction, either
opposing the dividend effect.
3.3 The Combined Effect on Relative Prices
Turning now to the typical relative price, its equilibrium dynamics with respect to βk (ω, t)
are given by (2), which may be re-written in terms of percentage changes in the two absolute
It is non-increasing (r′A (·) ≤ 0) only if u′′′ (·) ≥ −u′′ (·) rA (·) > 0.
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prices:
1
pn (I (ω, t))
∂pn (I (ω, t))
∂βk (ω, t)
=
1
Pn (I (ω, t))
∂Pn (I (ω, t))
∂βk (ω, t)
− 1
P0 (I (ω, t))
∂P0 (I (ω, t))
∂βk (ω, t)
(9)
The resulting relation is in general complex enough to preclude predictions using only
economic intuition.14 The risk-aversion effect, by pushing the two absolute prices in the
same direction, has an ambiguous effect on the relative price. And to further complicate
things, it pushes each absolute price always in the opposite direction of the dividend effect
while, as we know from the preceding discussion, it may pull it in either direction relative
to the asset-riskiness effect.
An example when asset-riskiness is dominant
A concrete example of such equilibrium price dynamics is provided by the setting in which
the agent exhibits DARA while the dividends of the nth and n′th securities (n′ ∈ N \{0, n})
are correlated with the mth and the kth Brownian motions (m 6= k), respectively, with
either correlation being exclusive. In addition, these Brownian motions do not affect other
components of the terminal-period wealth (σn = σnmem, σn′ = σn′kek,
∂ρ(I(ω,T ))
∂βk(ω,T )
= 0 =
∂ρ(I(ω,T ))
∂βm(ω,T )
, and σn′′k = 0 = σn′′m for all n
′′ ∈ N \ {n, n′}).15 The corresponding terminal-
period wealth specification is a special case of (7) with M = 1
W (T, I (ω, t) ,x) = W
−(k,m)
(
T, I (ω, t) ,x
−(k,m)
)
(10)
+ Gn′ (T, I (ω, t) , xk) +Gn (T, I (ω, t) , xm)
In this case (see Proposition 2), the nth relative price is increasing (decreasing) in the
realization βk (ω, t) if σn′k > 0 (σn′k < 0). Observe, however, that (6) and (9) give the
risk-aversion effect on the relative price as
Ex [Gn (T, I (ω, t) ,x)]
P0 (I (ω, t)) Ex
[
u′′ (W (T, I (ω, t) ,x)) ∂W (T, I (ω, t) ,x)
∂βk (ω, t)
]
−pn (I (ω, t))
P0 (I (ω, t))Ex [G0 (T, I (ω, t) ,x)]Ex
[
u′′ (W (T, I (ω, t) ,x)) ∂W (T, I (ω, t) ,x)
∂βk (ω, t)
]
Suppose now that the dividend of the zero security is riskless. Then, P0 (I (ω, t)) =
G0 (T )Ex [u
′ (W (T, I (ω, t) ,x))] and, by Lemma A.2 in the Appendix, the expression above
14Observe that, albeit the typical dividend follows a geometric Brownian motion, the typical relative price
will not do so apart from a special case. For the setting in which there is one risky security and a zero-coupon
bond while the agent has no endowment (other than the net supply of the stock), Bick [10] shows that the
relative price follows a geometric Brownian motion in equilibrium if and only if the agent exhibits CRRA.
For general dimensions of the Brownian process and many risky assets, this is confirmed in Raimondo [62]
(see Remark 1 and Example 1).
15As usual, em ∈ RK denotes the vector with 1 at its mth entry and zeroes elsewhere.
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simplifies to16
(Ex [Gn (T, I (ω, t) ,x)]−G0 (T ) pn (I (ω, t))) 1
G0 (T )
∂P0(I(ω,t))
∂βk(ω,t)
P0 (I (ω, t)) (11)
=
Ex [Gn (T, I (ω, t) ,x)]
G0 (T )
(
1− Ex
[
u′
(
W
(
T, I (ω, t) ,x+√T − tσn
))]
Ex [u′ (W (T, I (ω, t) ,x))]
) ∂P0(I(ω,t))
∂βk(ω,t)
P0 (I (ω, t))
Under (10), however, we have
W
(
T, I (ω, t) ,x+√T − tσn
)
= W (T, I (ω, t) ,x)
+ Gn
(
T, I (ω, t) , xm +
√
T − tσnm
)
−Gn (T, I (ω, t) , xm)
= W (T, I (ω, t) ,x) +
(
e(T−t)σ
2
nm − 1
)
Gn (T, I (ω, t) , xm)
Clearly, the bracketed term on the right-hand side of (11) is strictly positive and, thus, the
risk-aversion effect pulls the nth relative price in the same direction as either absolute price.
And since σn′k
∂W (T,I(ω,t),x)
∂βk(ω,t)
> 0, the absolute prices move contrary to (in) the direction of
dβk (ω, t) when σn′k > 0 (σn′k < 0). In other words, the risk-aversion effect on the relative
price is negative (positive) if σn′k > 0 (σn′k < 0). Clearly, the monotonicity in the relative
price dynamics is due to the fact that the asset-riskness effect dominates the risk-aversion
one.
An example when risk aversion is dominant
The direction and importance of the asset-riskiness effect for the relative price dynamics
depends also on the agent’s attitude towards risk. To illustrate, consider the setting in
which the agent exhibits CARA, the zero dividend is again riskless, while themth Brownian
motion affects both the nth and n′th terminal dividends.17 Let also the former dividend
be independent of any other Brownian component and the latter be correlated also with
but only with the kth Brownian motion. This Brownian dimension in turn affects no other
component of wealth (σn = σnmem, σn′ = σn′mem + σn′kek,
∂ρ(I(ω,T ))
∂βk(ω,T )
= 0, and σn′′k = 0
for all n′′ ∈ N0 \ {n, n′}). The corresponding wealth specification is given by
W (T, I (ω, t) ,x) = W−k (T, I (ω, t) ,x−k) (12)
+ Gn (T, I (ω, t) , xm) +Gn′ (T, I (ω, t) , (xk, xm))
In this setting (see Proposition 3), as long as σnmσn′m > 0, a rise in βk (t) decreases
(increases) the nth relative price if σn′k > 0 (σn′k < 0). To analyze this result in terms
16Under the specification in (4), Gn (W (T, I (ω, t) ,x)) = eµnT+σ⊺n(β(ω,t)+
√
T−tx). Lemma A.2 then
gives Ex [Gn (W (T, I (ω, t) ,x))] = eµnT+σ
⊺
n
(
β(ω,t)+
(T−t)σn
2
)
. And applying it once more, Pn (I (ω, t)) =
Ex [Gn (W (T, I (ω, t) ,x))]Ex
[
u′
(
W
(
T, I (ω, t) ,x+√T − tσn
))]
.
17Recall that u : R++ 7→ R exhibits CARA if it is given as u (w) = γeαw for some γ, α < 0. In particular,
we have u′′ (w) = −rAu′ (w) with rA a constant.
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of the asset-riskness and risk-aversion effects, we need to determine the direction of the
latter. To this end, let us restrict attention further to the case in which the mth Brownian
motion affects no other component of the terminal-period wealth but the two dividends
(
∂ρ(I(ω,T ))
∂βm(ω,T )
= 0 and σn′′m = 0 for all n
′′ ∈ N \ {n, n′}). The subcase of (12) in question
W (T, I (ω, t) ,x) (13)
= W
−(k,m)
(
T, I (ω, t) ,x
−(k,m)
)
+Gn′ (T, I (ω, t) , (xk, xm)) +Gn (T, I (ω, t) , xm)
gives
W
(
T, I (ω, t) , xm +
√
T − tσnm
)
−W (T, I (ω, t) ,x)
=
(
e(T−t)σn′mσnm − 1
)
Gn′ (T, I (ω, t) , (xm, xk)) +
(
e(T−t)σ
2
nm − 1
)
Gn (T, I (ω, t) , xm)
so that W
(
T, I (ω, t) , xm +
√
T − tσnm
)
> W (T, I (ω, t) ,x) if σnmσn′m > 0. As before,
by (11), the risk-aversion on the relative price operates in the same direction as it does on
either of the absolute prices. And again as before, σn′k
∂W (T,I(ω,t),x)
∂βk(ω,t)
> 0 means that the
absolute prices move contrary to (in) the direction of dβk (ω, t) when σn′k > 0 (σn′k < 0).
As opposed to the preceding DARA example, the relative price dynamics are determined
here by the risk-aversion effect.
Identifying the combined effect
The preceding observations attest to the richness of the dynamics under study. And this
arises even though, in either example above, the relative dividend
Gn (I (ω, T )) := Gn (I (ω, T ))
G0 (I (ω, T )) =
An (T )
A0 (T )
eσ
⊺
nβ(ω,T )
where
σn := (σnk)(n,k)∈N\{0}×K = (σnk − σ0k)(n,k)∈N\{0}×K
is not correlated with the kth Brownian component (σnk = 0 = σ0k). When it is, the
combination of the three potentially contradicting effects that drive the equilibrium price
dynamics ought to produce even more complexity.
Let for instance the terminal wealth be increasing in the current realization of the
kth Brownian motion (∂W (I(ω,T ))∂βk(ω,T ) > 0, which would obtain for example if σnk > 0 and
∂ρ(I(ω,T ))
∂βk(ω,T )
, σn′,k ≥ 0 ∀n′ ∈ N \ {n}). If σnk > 0, an increase in βk (ω, t) raises its Ft-
conditional expectation of the nth dividend, pushing Pn (I (ω, t)) upwards through the
own-dividend effect. Yet, it increases also the agent’s terminal wealth and, if for instance
she exhibits DARA, this exerts negative risk-aversion effects on either of P0 (I (ω, t)) and
Pn (I (ω, t)). Finally, as pointed out in the previous subsection, the asset-riskiness effect on
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either absolute price may go in either direction.
Nevertheless, and somewhat surprisingly, it turns out that the relation between the
typical relative price and the typical Brownian component is always monotone as long as
the relative dividend varies with the Brownian motion in question.
Proposition 1 Let T = [0, T ] for some T ∈ R++ and suppose that the dividend process
of every security n ∈ N is given by (4) and gn (·) = 0 a.e. on Ω× [0, T ]. Then,
∀ (n, k) ∈ N \ {0} × K : σnk 6= 0⇒ σnk ∂pn (I (ω, t))
∂βk (ω, t)
> 0
Proof. See Appendix C. Keep in mind also that the proof remains valid if u′ (W (I (ω, T )))
and u˜′
(
W˜ (I (ω, ·))
)
are replaced, respectively, by general pricing kernels M : I (ω, T ) 7→
R++ and m : I (ω, ·) 7→ R++.
An intuitive exegesis of this result is straightforward when the nth relative dividend is
correlated with only one Brownian component and this relation is exclusive. The corre-
sponding wealth specification is another special case of (7) with M = 1, and would obtain
if σn = σnmem,
∂ρ(I(ω,T ))
∂βm(ω,T )
= 0, and σn′m = 0 ∀n′ ∈ N \ {0, n}. In this setting, let βm (ω, t)
change by dβm (ω, t). For any realization xm, the terminal wealth changes now only through
the nth dividend, the new value of which is
Gn
(
T, βm (ω, t) + dβm (ω, t) +
√
T − txm
)
= e(µn−µ0)T+σnm(βm(ω,t)+dβm(ω,t)+
√
T−txm)
= eσnmdβm(ω,t)Gn (T, I (ω, t) , xm)
Moreover, since the representative agent is everywhere non-satiated (u′ (·) > 0) and any
other component of her terminal wealth remains unaffected by dβm (ω, t), her preferences
change in the direction of First-order Stochastic Dominance (FSD).
Suppose, more specifically, that βm (ω, t) increases (decreases). If σnm > 0, the new
relative dividend dominates (is dominated by) the old in the sense of FSD. The agent is
now more (less) willing to hold the nth security relative to the zero one and, facing their
respective fixed supplies, pushes up (down) the nth relative price. If σnm < 0, on the other
hand, the new relative dividend is dominated by (dominates) the old in terms of FSD so
that now the agent finds the nth security less (more) attractive relative to the zero one. In
either case, therefore, σnm
∂pn(ω,t)
∂βm(ω,t)
> 0.18
18Put differently, when σnm > 0 (σnm < 0), going from the old to the new relative dividend takes us in the
opposite (same) direction as Proposition 1 in Gollier [34], the factor being eσnmdβm(ω,t). For any risk-averse
individual, dβm (ω, t) increases (reduces) the optimal demand for the nth security relative to the zero one
and, consequently, the nth equilibrium relative price. Of course, Gollier studies probability distributions
whose supports are closed intervals but this restriction is inconsequential in the present context.
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4 Contagion with Lump-sum Dividends
We just established that the typical relative price varies monotonically with the current
realization of the typical Brownian component, when the relative dividend is correlated
with this component (σnk 6= 0). Next, we examine the case when it is not (σnk = 0). As it
turns out, apart from a very special case, the typical relative price will be correlated with
the typical Brownian component even when the relative dividend is not, a phenomenon
which I will refer to as contagion.
My aim in what follows will be to identify conditions on the economic primitives that
suffice for pn (I (ω, t)) to vary with βk (ω, t), and monotonically so. To this end, I will
present some results which, in conjunction with Proposition 1, completely describe the
comparative statics of the corresponding economy. Namely, they sign every entry in the
dispersion matrix of relative prices, the Jacobian
Jp (I (ω, t)) =
[
∂pn (I (ω, t))
∂βk (ω, t)
]
(n,k)∈N\{0}×K
Contagion under DARA
The characteristics of contagion due to market-clearing depend on (i) the terminal-wealth
specification with respect to terminal realization of the Brownian process, and (ii) the
functional form of the agent’s utility function (in particular, her attitude towards risk).
To demonstrate the prevalence of contagion, I will progressively stack the cards against
it, starting with the hypothesis that the terminal endowment is correlated neither with
the kth nor with any Brownian dimension which affects the nth dividend (condition (i)
below) while the dividends that vary with the kth Brownian dimension do so in the same
direction (condition (iv) below), and are not correlated with any of the dimensions that
affect the nth dividend (condition (ii) below). In addition, the factor loadings on each of
the Brownian motions that do affect the nth dividend are proportional across the dividends
with which they are correlated (condition (iii) below). When the agent exhibits DARA,
these restrictions suffice for monotone relative price contagion.19
Proposition 2 Let T = [0, T ] for some T ∈ R++ and suppose that the dividend process of
each security n ∈ N is given by (4) and gn (·) = 0 a.e. on Ω× [0, T ]. Suppose also that u (·)
exhibits DARA while the following conditions apply.
(i) σnk = 0 = σ0k and
∂ρ(I(ω,T ))
∂βk′ (ω,T )
= 0 ∀k′ ∈ Kn ∪ {k}.
(ii) ∀n′ ∈ N \ {n}: Kn′ ∩Kn 6= ∅ only if k 6∈ Kn′
19As obviously n ∈ NM , condition (iii) precludes the existence of any m ∈ Kn s.t. σnm = σ0m. It also
implies that σn′m 6= 0 for some m ∈ Kn iff σn′m 6= 0 across Kn; hence, the notation NM = ∪m∈KnNm.
In addition, as long as 0 ∈ NM , it dictates that σ0m = λ0 (σnm − σ0m) and σnm = λn (σnm − σ0m) for
some λ0, λn ∈ R∗. That is, σnm =
(
1+λ0
λ0
)
σ0m and σ0m =
(
λn−1
λn
)
σnm, which together require that
λnλ0 = (λn − 1) (1 + λ0). By contrast, if σ0m = 0 for some m ∈ Kn, then (λ0, λn) = (0, 1).
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(iii.a) ∀n′ ∈ NM := ∪m∈KnNm, ∃λn′ ∈ R∗ s.t. σn′m = λn′σnm ∀m×Kn.
(iii.b) λnλn′ > 0 ∀n′ ∈ NM .
(iv) σn′′kσn′′′k > 0 ∀n′′, n′′′ ∈ Nk.
Then
σn′′kσn′m
σnm
∂pn (I (ω, t))
∂βk (ω, t)
> 0 if
(
n′, n′′,m
) ∈ NM ×Nk ×Kn
Proof. See Appendix C. Notice also that the proof remains valid when the agent exhibits
instead IARA, in which case the statement is exactly the same but for reversing the last
inequality above.
This result refers to the following terminal-wealth specification
W (I (ω, T )) = ρ (T, β
−(M,k) (ω, T )
)
+
∑
n′′ 6∈NM
e
µn′′T+
∑
k∈K\Kn
σn′′kβk(ω,T ) (14)
+
∑
n′∈NM
e
∑
m∈Kn
λn′σnmβm(ω,T )eµn′T+
∑
k′∈K\(Kn∪{k})
σn′k′βk′ (ω,T )
although it is perhaps more instructive for our purposes to look at the special case in which
the nth dividend is correlated with only one Brownian component (Kn = {m} for some
m ∈ K \ {k}). Now, the terminal wealth specification is given by
W (I (ω, T )) = ρ (T, β
−(m,k) (ω, T )
)
+
∑
n′′∈Nk
eµn′′T+
∑
k∈K\{m} σn′′kβk(ω,T ) (15)
+
∑
n′∈Nm
eλn′σnmβm(ω,T )eµn′T+
∑
k′∈K\{m,k} σn′k′βk′ (ω,T )
and the covariance matrix Σ1 depicts a relevant situation regarding the factor loadings of
all but the zero security. In the corresponding economy, the first security is correlated only
with the first Brownian component, a macro-risk factor affecting all securities (but possibly
the zero one). Proposition 2 dictates that λσ2k
∂p1(I(ω,t))
∂βk(ω,t)
> 0 for k ∈ {2, 3}, as long as
α > 0, σ01 6= σ11, σ0k = 0, the terminal-period endowment is independent of the first and
the kth Brownian components, and γk > 0.
Σ1 =
 σ11 0 0λσ11 σ22 σ23
αλσ11 γ2σ22 γ3σ23
 Σ2 =
 σ11 0 00 σ22 σ23
0 γ2σ22 γ3σ23

Recall now that Proposition 1 applies to all but the second and third entries of the
Jacobian of relative prices. Namely, we have σnk
∂pn(I(ω,t))
∂βk(ω,t)
> 0 for (n, k) ∈ {(1, 1)} ∪
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({2, 3} × {2, 3}) and αn−2λσ11 ∂pn(I(ω,t))∂β1(ω,t) > 0 for n ∈ {2, 3}. In conjunction, therefore, with
the preceding result we may sign the entire matrix. All relations between relative prices
and Brownian components will be then monotone.
A particular case of the economic setting just described is the one depicted by the
covariance matrix Σ2, where the first Brownian component represents a risk-factor for which
the first security is an exclusive “bet.” In this case, Proposition 2 gives σ2kσ11σ11
∂p1(I(ω,t))
∂βk(ω,t)
> 0
as well as σ11γkσ2k
∂pk(I(ω,t))
∂β1(ω,t)
> 0 for k ∈ {2, 3}. This example brings us forward in our quest
to stack the cards as much as possible against contagion. For contagion obtains now even
though the nth dividend is correlated with only one Brownian component, which in turn
affects only the nth relative dividend. Indeed, when Kn = {m} and Nm ∈ {{n} , {0, n}} for
some m ∈ K \ {k}, Proposition 2 gives σn′kσnmσnm
∂pn(I(ω,t))
∂βk(ω,t)
> 0 ∀n′ ∈ Nk.
This is the culminant result in our attempt to demonstrate the prevalence of conta-
gion. For it applies even when the underlying setting is the most restrictive against cross-
correlations in relative prices. I am referring of course to the terminal wealth specification
in (10) which restricts the kth and mth Brownian components to be correlated exclusively
with the n′th and nth dividends. Under this requirement, both sets Kn and Nk are single-
tons (Kn = {m}, Nm = {n}, and Nk = {n′} for some m ∈ K\{k} and n′ ∈ N \{0, n}) and
the result reads σn′k
∂pn(I(ω,t))
∂βk(ω,t)
> 0.
Σ3 =
 σ11 0 00 σ22 0
0 0 σ33
 Σ4 =
 σ11 0 0λσ11 σ22 0
αλσ11 0 σ33

And this applies even for the case in which the matrix of factor loadings is diagonal, as in
the example depicted by the covariance matrix Σ3. Here, the claim is valid for any security
n and any Brownian motion k 6= n as long as the dividend of the zero security and terminal-
period endowment are correlated with neither the nth nor the kth Brownian component. In
particular, if these two wealth components are deterministic, the corresponding terminal-
wealth specification
W (I (ω, T )) = ρ (T ) +G0 (T ) +
K∑
k=1
Gk (T, βk (ω, T )) (16)
is such that each and every relative price varies monotonically with each and every Brownian
dimension. Once again, in conjunction with Proposition 1, we can sign the entire Jacobian
matrix of the relative price process: σkk
∂pn(I(ω,t))
∂βk(ω,t)
> 0 ∀ (n, k) ∈ K.
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Remark. Notice that Proposition 2 applies also under the specification
W (I (ω, T )) = ρ1 (T, β−m (ω, T )) + ρ2 (T, βm (ω, T ))
+
∑
n′′∈∪k∈K\{m}Nk
Gn′′ (T, β−m (ω, T )) +
∑
n′∈Nm
Gn′ (T, βm (ω, T ))
= W1 (T, β−m (ω, T )) +W2 (T, βm (ω, T )) (17)
for some continuous functions ρ1 : R
K−1 7→ R+ and ρ2 : R 7→ R+, as long as σnm 6= 0,
λk
∂W1(T,β−m(ω,T ))
∂βk(ω,T )
> 0 and λm
∂W2(T,βm(ω,T ))
∂βm(ω,T )
> 0 for some λk, λm ∈ R∗ and for all β (ω, T ) ∈
R
K . It is straightforward to reproduce the proof in the Appendix for this setting and verify
that σnmλmλk
∂pn(I(ω,t))
∂βk(ω,t)
> 0.
Contagion under CARA
Cross-correlations will generally be nonzero even when the representative agent exhibits
CARA. And here too, there are settings of economic primitives under which the relative
price pn (I (ω, t)) remains monotone in βk (ω, t) even though k 6∈ Kn. As before, I will
demonstrate the prevalence of contagion due to market-clearing by progressively stacking
the cards against contagion.
To this end, consider first the same setting as in Proposition 2 but for the fact that
now the terminal wealth endowment needs to be uncorrelated only with the kth Brownian
motion (condition (i) below), while any dividend which is correlated with the kth Brownian
motion is correlated also with each and every of the Brownian dimensions that affect the
nth dividend (condition (ii) below), and the signs of the respective factor loadings satisfy
condition (iv) below.20
Proposition 3 Let T = [0, T ] for some T ∈ R++ and suppose that the dividend process of
each security n ∈ {0, . . . , N} is given by (4) and gn (·) = 0 a.e. on Ω× [0, T ]. Suppose also
that u (·) exhibits CARA while the following conditions apply.
(i) σnk = 0 = σ0k and
∂ρ(I(ω,T ))
∂βk(ω,T )
= 0.
(ii) ∀n′ ∈ N \ {n}: k ∈ Kn′ only if Kn ⊆ Kn′.
(iii) ∀n′ ∈ NM , ∃λn′ ∈ R∗: σn′m = λn′σnm ∀m ∈ Kn.
(iv)
σn′mσn′k
σn′′mσn′′k
> 0 ∀ (n′, n′′,m) ∈ N2k ×Kn.
Then
σn′kσn′m
σnm
∂pn (I (ω, t))
∂βk (ω, t)
< 0 if
(
n′,m
) ∈ Nk ×Kn
20Even though not directly relevant for the type of contagion under study here, it should be pointed out
that Proposition 3 applies also under the less restrictive assumption σnk = σ0k in condition (i). When
σnk = σ0k but σnkσ0k 6= 0, condition (iii) dictates that λnλ0 > 0 (recall the preceding footnote), so that
either (λ0, λn) ∈ R∗+ × (1,∞) or (λ0, λn) ∈ (−∞,−1)× R∗−.
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Proof. See Appendix C.
This result refers to the following terminal-wealth specification
W (I (ω, T )) = ρ (T, β−k (ω, T ))
+
∑
n′∈Nk
e
∑
m∈Kn
λn′σnmβm(ω,T )eµn′T+
∑
k′∈K\Kn
σn′k′βk′ (ω,T )
+
∑
n′ 6∈Nk
eµn′T+
∑
k′∈K\{k} σn′k′βk′ (ω,T ) (18)
To illustrate, consider again the dispersion matrix Σ1. Under CARA, we can determine the
dynamics of the first relative price with respect to changes in the current realization of one
of the non-macroeconomic risk-factors (k ∈ {2, 3}), as long as σ01 6= σ11, the zero dividend
and the terminal-period endowment are not correlated with this factor, and αγk > 0. In
this case, Proposition 3 requires that λσ2k
∂p1(I(ω,t))
∂βk(ω,t)
< 0.
A special case that constrains this economic setup against cross-correlations more is
depicted by the matrix Σ4. In this example, the kth Brownian component (k ∈ {2, 3})
affects only the one terminal dividend which is correlated also with the first Brownian
motion. As long as σ01 6= σ11 and the zero dividend and the terminal-period endowment
are not correlated with this factor, we ought to have αk−2λσkk
∂p1(I(ω,t))
∂βk(ω,t)
< 0.
The special case of no contagion
At first glance, Proposition 3 might seem puzzling as it contradicts the rather commonly-
held view that, under CARA, changes in wealth that are independent of an asset’s payoff
should not matter for its equilibrium relative price. This assertion stems from the well-
known fact that, under CARA, changes in wealth that do not affect the risk premium of
an asset should leave its relative price unchanged. Even in the absence of own-dividend
effects (σnk = 0 = σ0k), however, this type of wealth changes follow from changes in the
current information βk (ω, t) only if the asset-riskiness effect on the relative price exactly
cancels out the risk-aversion one. And, under CARA, the latter relation obtains whenever
the kth Brownian component affects the terminal wealth independently from the Brownian
dimensions which are correlated with the nth relative dividend.
Proposition 4 Let T = [0, T ] for some T ∈ R++ and suppose that the dividend process of
each security n ∈ {0, . . . , N} is given by (4) and gn (·) = 0 a.e. on Ω× [0, T ]. Suppose also
that u (·) exhibits CARA while the following conditions apply.
(i) σnk = 0 = σ0k and ρ (I (ω, T )) = ρ1 (I (ω, T )) + ρ2 (I (ω, T )), for some continuous
functions ρ1, ρ2 : R
K 7→ R+, such that ∂ρ1(I(ω,T ))∂βk(ω,T ) = 0 =
∂ρ2(I(ω,T ))
∂βm(ω,T )
∀m ∈ Kn ∪K0.
(ii) Nm ∩Nk = ∅ ∀m ∈ Kn ∪K0.
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Then
∂pn (I (ω, t))
∂βk (ω, t)
= 0
Proof. See Appendix C.
Regarding the corresponding wealth specification, consider the partition {KL,K \KL}
such that k 6∈ KL ⊇ Kn ∪K0. Let then
W (T, I (ω, t) ,x)
= ρ1
((
T, βL (ω, t) +
√
T − txL
))
+ ρ2
((
T, β−L (ω, t) +
√
T − tx−L
))
+
∑
n∈∪m∈KLNm
Gn
((
T, βL (ω, t) +
√
T − txL
))
+
∑
n′∈∪m∈K\KLNm
Gn′
((
T, β−L (ω, t) +
√
T − tx−L
))
(19)
= W1
((
T, βL (ω, t) +
√
T − txL
))
+W2
((
T, β−L (ω, t) +
√
T − tx−L
))
which embeds (7) - thus, also (17) - as well as (18) and (16). For the latter formulation,
moreover, notice that we remain within the realm of the specification above if the endowment
functional is replaced by
ρ (I (ω, T )) =
K∑
k=1
ρk (T, βk (ω, T ))
for some continuous functions ρk : R → R+. Observe also that yet another subcase is the
following
W (I (ω, T )) = ρ1 (T, β−k (ω, T )) + ρ2 (T, βk (ω, T ))
+
∑
n 6∈Nk
Gn (T, β−k (ω, T )) +Gn′ (T, βk (ω, T )) (20)
for some continuous functions ρ1 : R
K−1 7→ R+ and ρ2 : R 7→ R+.
Of course, Proposition 4 appears to support the premise that, under CARA, changes in
wealth that are independent of an asset’s payoff should not matter for its relative price. Yet,
the fact that the relative price is not correlated with the kth Brownian dimension is neither
because the relative dividend itself is uncorrelated nor due to CARA alone. The result
depends also, and fundamentally so, upon the separability between the channels through
which the kth and any of the Brownian motions that affect the nth dividend operate in
(19). Indeed, we do know (recall Proposition 3) that, without separability, the relative price
may well be correlated with the kth Brownian dimension even though both the CARA as
well as the σnk = 0 assumption are maintained.
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To see what is so special about the underlying separability in (19), recall the fundamental
pricing relation in (5). Since k 6∈ KL ⊇ Kn ∪K0, we have
Pj (I (ω, t)) = Ex
[
γeαW (I(ω,T ))Gj (T, βM (ω, T ))
]
= Ex−L
[
eαW2(T,β−L(ω,T ))
]
ExL
[
eαW1(T,βL(ω,T ))Gj (T, βM (ω, T ))
]
for j = 0, n. That is,
∂Pj (I (ω, t))
∂βk (ω, t)
= Pj (I (ω, t))
Ex−L
[
αγeαW2(T,β−L(ω,T ))
∂W2(T,β−L(ω,T ))
∂βk(ω,T )
]
Ex−L
[
eαγW2(T,β−L(ω,T ))
]
and, by (9), the relative price cannot be correlated with the kth Brownian dimension.21
Most probably, the erroneously crude intuition behind the “zero cross-correlations under
CARA” premise stems from the multitude of examples in the financial economics literature
that take the agent’s wealth to be linearly-dependent upon asset payoffs. Although ren-
dering discrete-time models analytically tractable and elegant, the linearity assumption ob-
scures our grasp of the interaction between the asset-riskiness and risk-aversion effects on rel-
ative equilibrium prices. Indeed, lettingW2 (I (ω, T )) =W0
(
T, β
−(L,k) (ω, T )
)
+λkβk (ω, T ),
for some continuous function W0 : R
K−L−1 → R+ and λk ∈ R∗, falls well within the setting
just analyzed. In this sense, the linearity assumption forces the asset-riskiness and risk-
aversion effects on the relative equilibrium price to cancel each other out. And this is so
irrespectively of the correlations between the various other elements of the agent’s wealth.22
5 Price Dynamics with Dividend Flows
We now turn to the setting in which the securities pay also dividend flows during T . If
they do so without offering lump sums, the asset-pricing equation is given by the second
term on the right-hand side of (1) (as in, for instance, Cochrane et al. [18], Martin [49],
or Farhi and Panageas [28]). In this case, [23] (see Section 3.2) shows that the equilibrium
price dynamics are given by
Pn (I (ω, t)) =
∫ T
t
Pn,s (I (ω, t)) ds ∂Pn (I (ω, t))
∂βk (ω, t)
=
∫ T
t
∂Pn,s (I (ω, t))
∂βk (ω, t)
ds
and
P0 (I (ω, t))2 ∂pn (I (ω, t))
∂βk (ω, t)
=
∫ T
t
P0,s (I (ω, t))2 ∂pn,s (I (ω, t))
∂βk (ω, t)
ds
21It is trivial to check that this result obtains also when u (·) is quadratic.
22Needless to say, given that the Ft-conditional future realizations βk (T )−βk (t) are normally-distributed
here, the linearity assumption requires also unlimited liability, an unrealistically strong condition (implying
that the agent may lose more than everything with positive probability). Yet, this drawback is well-known.
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for (n, k) ∈ N × K, with Pn,s (·) and pn,s (·) being the respective prices in the analysis of
the preceding subsection taking s to be the terminal date. Clearly, our previous results can
be re-stated now as follows.23
Proposition 5 Let T ⊆ R++ and suppose that the dividend process of every n ∈ N is
given by (3) and Gn (·) = 0 a.e. on Ω× {T}. Then,
∀ (n, k) ∈ N \ {0} × K : (σ˜nk − σ˜0k) 6= 0⇒ (σ˜nk − σ˜0k) ∂pn (I (ω, t))
∂βk (ω, t)
> 0
Proposition 6 Let T ⊆ R++ and suppose that the dividend process of every n ∈ N is
given by (3) and Gn (·) = 0 a.e. on Ω× {T}. Suppose also that u˜ (·) exhibits DARA while
the following conditions apply.
(i) σ˜nk = 0 = σ˜0k and
∂ρ˜(I(ω,t))
∂βk′ (ω,t)
= 0 ∀k′ ∈ K˜n ∪ {k}.
(ii) ∀n′ ∈ N \ {n}: K˜n′ ∩ K˜n 6= ∅ only if k 6∈ K˜n′
(iii.a) ∀n′ ∈ N˜M := ∪m∈K˜nN˜m, ∃λ˜n′ ∈ R∗ s.t. σ˜n′m = λ˜n′ (σ˜nm − σ˜0m) ∀m× K˜n.
(iii.b) λ˜nλ˜n′ > 0 ∀n′ ∈ N˜M .
(iv) σ˜n′′kσ˜n′′′k > 0 ∀n′′, n′′′ ∈ N˜k.
Then
σ˜n′′kσ˜n′m
σ˜nm − σ˜0m
∂pn (I (ω, t))
∂βk (ω, t)
> 0 if
(
n′, n′′,m
) ∈ N˜M × N˜k × K˜n
Proposition 7 Let T ⊆ R++ and suppose that the dividend process of every security n ∈ N
is given by (3) and Gn (·) = 0 a.e. on Ω×{T}. Suppose also that u˜ (·) exhibits CARA while
the following conditions apply.
(i) σ˜nk = 0 = σ˜0k and
∂ρ˜(I(ω,t))
∂βk(ω,t)
= 0.
(ii) ∀n′ ∈ N \ {n}: k ∈ K˜n′ only if K˜n ⊆ K˜n′.
(iii) ∀n′ ∈ N˜M , ∃λ˜n′ ∈ R∗ s.t. σ˜n′m = λ˜n′ (σ˜nm − σ˜0m) ∀m× K˜n.
(iv)
(
σ˜n′m
σ˜n′′m
)(
σ˜n′k
σ˜n′′k
)
> 0 ∀ (n′, n′′,m) ∈ N˜2k × K˜n.
Then
σ˜n′k
(
σ˜n′m
σ˜nm − σ˜0m
)
∂pn (I (ω, t))
∂βk (ω, t)
< 0 if
(
n′,m
) ∈ N˜k × K˜n
23The notation here is the direct analogue of the one used thus far. For (n, k) ∈ N × K, we let K˜n =
{k ∈ K : σnk 6= 0} and Nm = {n ∈ N : σnm 6= 0}. We also assume that N˜m 6= ∅ ∀m ∈ K and K˜n 6= ∅
∀n ∈ N\{0} with σ˜n 6= σ˜n′ for any two different n, n′ ∈ N . Moreover, N˜M = {n′ ∈ N : ∃m ∈ Kn, σ˜n′m 6= 0}.
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Proposition 8 Let T ⊆ R++ and suppose that the dividend process of every security n ∈ N
is given by (3) and Gn (·) = 0 a.e. on Ω×{T}. Suppose also that u˜ (·) exhibits CARA while
the following conditions apply.
(i) σ˜nk = 0 = σ˜0k and ρ˜ (I (ω, t)) = ρ˜1 (I (ω, t)) + ρ˜2 (I (ω, t)), for some continuous
functions ρ˜1, ρ˜2 : R
K 7→ R+, such that ∂ρ˜1(I(ω,t))∂βk(ω,t) = 0 =
∂ρ˜2(I(ω,t))
∂βm(ω,t)
∀m ∈ K˜n ∪ K˜0.
(ii) N˜m ∩ N˜k = ∅ ∀m ∈ K˜n ∪ K˜0.
Then
∂pn (I (ω, t))
∂βk (ω, t)
= 0
Needless to say, the entire analysis in the preceding section remains valid as is but for
the replacement of the respective factor loadings.
Lump-sums and Flows
It remains to examine the case in which the securities may pay both dividend flows during
the time-interval as well as lump sums on the terminal date. This presupposes a finite
time-horizon and requires that both terms on the right-hand side of (1) apply (as in, for
example, Anderson and Raimondo [5] or Cox et al. [20]). Thus, the partial derivative
of interest
∂pn(I(ω,t))
∂βk(ω,t)
becomes the sum of two terms, the two partial derivatives analyzed
in the preceding two subsections which I will denote here by
∂pn1(I(ω,t))
∂βk(ω,t)
and
∂pn2(I(ω,t))
∂βk(ω,t)
,
respectively. Applying the respective analysis to each term, an appropriate re-statement of
our result is again immediate.24
The only statements that do not follow from our analysis thus far are parts II of Propo-
sition 9 and I.B of Propositions 10 and 11. With respect to these results, notice first that
aj (·) being analytic suffices for gj (·) to be so given that the exponential function is analytic
and so is the product of two analytic functions. Observe also that the current setting can be
embedded in the one of Anderson and Raimondo [5]. The latter paper established that, for
arbitrary ω ∈ Ω and (n, k) ∈ N × K, as a function [0, T ]× RK 7→ R, the partial derivative
∂pn(I(ω,t))
∂βk(ω,t)
is continuous on this domain and analytic on (0, T ) × RK .25 This means that,
for an arbitrary v ∈ R, the set
Snk (v) =
{
I (ω, t) ∈ (0, T )× RK : v∂pn (I (ω, t))
∂βk (ω, t)
= 0
}
24Notice that the analysis applies also when the agent exhibits IARA. In this case, Propositions 2, 6, and
10 are stated in exactly the same way but for reversing the respective last inequalities.
25We are referring to the analysis in Appendices B and D of Anderson and Raimondo [5]. Continuity
requires that (uGj) (·) satisfies some mild boundedness condition on {T} × RK (see pp. 888-889 and as-
sumption (1) in Anderson and Raimondo [5]). Analyticity, on the other hand, requires that u˜ and gj are
both analytic on (0, T )× RK .
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has positive Lebesgue measure only if v
(
∂pn1(I(ω,t))
∂βk(ω,t)
+
∂pn2(I(ω,t))
∂βk(ω,t)
)
= 0 everywhere on
(0, T )× RK .26
As t → T , however, on the one hand, the second term in (1) vanishes in the limit
and so does
∂pn2(I(ω,t))
∂βk(ω,t)
. On the other, the first term in (1) tends to Pj (I (ω, T )). That
is,
∂pn1(I(ω,t))
∂βk(ω,t)
approaches
∂pn(I(ω,T ))
∂βk(ω,T )
. Letting, therefore, v being one of σnk,
σn′′kσn′m
σnm
, or
σn′kσn′m
σnm
as required below, means that v ∂pn(I(ω,T ))∂βk(ω,T ) 6= 0, its actual sign given by Propo-
sitions 1-3, respectively. But then, continuity ensures the existence of a neighborhood
V
I(ω,T ) of I (ω, T ) such that v ∂pn(I(ω,t))∂βk(ω,t) 6= 0 everywhere in VI(ω,T ). And since VI(ω,T ) ∩(
(0, T )× RK) 6= ∅, analyticity requires that Snk (v) is null set.
Proposition 9 Let T = [0, T ] for some T ∈ R++ and suppose that the dividend process
of every n ∈ N is given by (4)-(3). Then,
(I) ∀ (n, k) ∈ N \ {0} × K: σ˜nkσnk > 0 only if σnk ∂pn(I(ω,t))∂βk(ω,t) > 0.
(II) ∀ (n, k) ∈ N \{0}×K: σ˜nk = 0 6= σnk while both functions u˜ (·) and an (·) are analytic
on (0, T )× RK , only if σnk ∂pn(I(ω,t))∂βk(ω,t) 6= 0 a.e. on [0, T ]× RK .
Proposition 10 Let T = [0, T ] for some T ∈ R++ and suppose that the dividend process
of every n ∈ N is given by (4)-(3). Suppose also that both u˜ (·) and u (·) exhibit DARA.
Then,
(I.A) σ˜nk 6= 0, conditions (i)-(iv) in Proposition 2 apply, and σn′′kσn′mσnmσ˜nk > 0 for (n
′, n′′,m) ∈
NM ×Nk ×Kn, only if σ˜nk ∂pn(I(ω,t))∂βk(ω,t) > 0.
(I.B) σ˜nk = 0, conditions (i)-(iv) in Proposition 2 apply, and both functions u˜ (·) and an (·)
are analytic on (0, T ) × RK , only if σn′′kσn′mσnm
∂pn(I(ω,t))
∂βk(ω,t)
6= 0 for (n′, n′′,m) ∈ NM ×
Nk ×Kn a.e. on [0, T ]× RK .
(II) σnk 6= 0, conditions (i)-(iv) in Proposition 6 apply, and σ˜n′′kσ˜n′mσ˜nmσnk > 0 for (n
′, n′′,m) ∈
N˜M × N˜k × K˜n, only if σnk ∂pn(I(ω,t))∂βk(ω,t) > 0.
(III) conditions (i)-(iv) in either Proposition 2 and 6 apply and
σ˜n′′kσ˜n′m
σ˜nm
σn′′kσn′m
σnm
> 0 for
(n′, n′′,m) ∈
(
N˜M × N˜k × K˜n
)
∩ (NM ×Nk ×Kn), only if
σn′′kσn′m
σnm
∂pn (I (ω, t))
∂βk (ω, t)
> 0
Proposition 11 Let T = [0, T ] for some T ∈ R++ and suppose that the dividend process
of every n ∈ N is given by (4)-(3). Suppose also that both u˜ (·) and u (·) exhibit CARA.
Then,
26See Theorem B.3 in Anderson and Raimondo [5]
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(I.A) σ˜nk 6= 0, conditions (i)-(iv) in Proposition 3 apply, and σn′kσn′mσnmσ˜nk > 0 for (n
′,m) ∈
Nk ×Kn, only if σ˜nk ∂pn(I(ω,t))∂βk(ω,t) < 0.
(I.B) σ˜nk = 0, conditions (i)-(iv) in Proposition 3 apply, and both functions u˜ (·) and an (·)
are analytic on (0, T )×RK , only if σn′kσn′mσnm
∂pn(I(ω,t))
∂βk(ω,t)
6= 0 for (n′,m) ∈ Nk ×Kn a.e.
on [0, T ]× RK .
(II) σnk 6= 0, conditions (i)-(iv) in Proposition 7 apply, and σ˜n′kσ˜n′mσ˜nmσnk > 0 for (n
′,m) ∈
N˜k × K˜n, only if σnk ∂pn(I(ω,t))∂βk(ω,t) < 0.
(III) conditions (i)-(iv) in either Proposition 3 and 7 apply and
σ˜n′kσ˜n′m
σ˜nm
σn′kσn′m
σnm
> 0 for
(n′,m) ∈
(
N˜k × K˜n
)
∩ (Nk ×Kn), only if
σn′kσn′m
σnm
∂pn (I (ω, t))
∂βk (ω, t)
< 0
Proposition 12 Let T = [0, T ] for some T ∈ R++ and suppose that the dividend process
of every n ∈ N is given by (4)-(3). Suppose also that both u˜ (·) and u (·) exhibit CARA
while conditions (i)-(ii) in either Proposition 4 and 8 apply. Then, ∂pn(I(ω,t))∂βk(ω,t) = 0.
6 Concluding Remarks
These results contribute towards our ability for economic analysis and prediction, even in
the cases when the representative agent’s portfolio policy is well-known. To illustrate, let
the zero security be a zero-coupon bond (or an annuity in terms of dividend flows) and the
agent exhibit CRRA. Suppose also that currently she is investing $150 ($1 representing one
unit of consumption) in the stock market, of which $100 are placed on risky securities and
the remainder on the bond. Following a negative shock that reduces the risky part of her
invested wealth to $85, it is well known that she will want to adjust her portfolio so that
her invested wealth remains split between stocks and bond in the original 2:1 ratio. She
will seek, that is, to invest $90 on stocks and $45 on the bond. Since the securities are in
fixed supply, their prices must adjust but is not clear how. Obviously, the price of at least
one stock (since each is in positive net supply) must fall whereas that of the bond (as it is
in zero net supply and the agent is risk averse) must rise. But which one is this stock and
what happens to the other stocks’ relative prices?
The preceding analysis sheds light on questions of this kind by looking at the economic
mechanism that determines how the relative price of the typical security responds to such
shocks. It highlights two separate channels through which shocks to current wealth affect
asset prices: by changing the agent’s risk aversion but also altering her perception of the
security’s “riskiness.” The dynamics of the former mechanism are well-known and straight-
forward. Those of the latter, however, have not hitherto been analyzed to any significant
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extent of generality.
Even when the dividend process is the geometric Brownian motion, without jumps,
rare events or other irregularities, the asset-price dynamics with respect to the underlying
fundamental risk are complex. In fact, they are so to the extent that assertions about the
direction of asset-price movements cannot be easily made, except for particular situations,
even when the dividend is independent from the risk source under study. To make this
point, my strategy has been to find specifications for the economic primitives under which
the sign of the correlation between the relative price of the typical security and the typical
Brownian motion remains unambiguous throughout the stochastic domain.
By establishing that, as a norm, asset prices are correlated with an underlying risk
source even when payoffs are not, my findings indicate that asset-price dynamics are much
richer than one is led to expect at first glance, armed with basic economic intuition. By
showing, on the other hand, that it is by no means straightforward to identify settings in
which the sign of this correlation remains constant, they attest to the complexity of these
dynamics. Together, richness and complexity suggest a tumultuous financial world, even
in the benchmark model of the present paper. They have also significant implications for
empirical asset-pricing. In particular, for the large body of work that focusses on partial-
equilibrium analysis, treating a small number of securities in isolation from the rest of the
market or modeling the equilibrium price process of an asset as a relation that depends only
on those risk sources that directly affect its payoff.
Of course, my results do not extend beyond state-independent utility functions for the
representative agent. Yet, within the context of general equilibrium analysis, this restriction
should not be taken at face value. One of the reasons that state-dependence appears natural
in some models is because they are partial equilibrium studies. If a significant portion of
household wealth is held on an asset that is not included in the model, changes in the
value of this asset induce wealth effects that alter the agents’ willingness to hold those
assets the model does include. As a consequence, value changes in the omitted asset seem
to be instances of state-dependent felicity. In a general equilibrium model, however, all
relevant assets are included by definition. This kind of state-dependence, therefore, would
disappear and the fact that the utility function is exogenously specified comes without loss
of generality.
In this sense, it is important that my results apply on the entire family of state-
independent utility functions that are monotone in risk-aversion. For, as long as the fi-
nancial market is dynamically complete, they encompass a wide array of economies that
have many agents with heterogenous preferences. In fact, the real limitation of my analysis
lies in the dividend specification. Even though it has been used widely in continuous-time
finance, it does nonetheless constraint the scope of my results given that my proofs, at some
point or another, all exploit the symmetry of the normal distribution.
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Appendices
A Preliminaries
The following result is borrowed from Diasakos [23] (see Lemma 4 in his Appendix) while
its antecedent is well-known.
Lemma A.1 Let S ⊆ RK be of non-zero Lebesgue measure. Suppose also that the functions
f : S2 7→ R+ and g : S2 7→ R are such that
(i) f (x,y) = f (y,x) a.e. on S2,27
(ii) h (x,y) + h (y,x) ≥ 0 a.e. on S2, and
27As usual, almost everywhere is meant to indicate validity throughout S2 modulo subsets of Lebesque-
measure zero.
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(iii) (fh) (·) is Lebesgue-integrable over S2.
Then ∫
S
2
f (x,y)h (x,y) d (x,y) ≥ 0
with strict inequality iff f (x,y) [h (x,y) + h (y,x)] 6= 0 on a subset of S2 of positive Lebesgue
measure.
Lemma A.2 Let x ∼ N (0, IK), θ ∈ RK , and h : RK → R s.t. Ex
[
eθ
⊺
xh (x)
]
is well-
defined. Then Ex
[
eθ
⊺
xh (x)
]
= e
θ⊺θ
2 Ex [h (x+ θ)].
Lemma A.3 Let the random vector x ∈ RK and the function g : RK 7→ R be s.t. Ex [g (x)]
and Ex [xkg (x)] are well-defined, with Ex [g (x)] 6= 0. Suppose also that f : R 7→ R is given
by f (yk) = Ex [(yk − xk) g (x)]. Then,
∃y∗k ∈ R : (yk − y∗k) f (yk)Ex [g (x)] > 0 ∀yk ∈ R \ {y∗k}
Proof. Given that Ex [g (x)] 6= 0, we can write
f (yk) = Ex [g (x)]
(
yk − Ex [xkg (x)]
Ex [g (x)]
)
and it suffices to define y∗k = Ex [xkg (x)] /Ex [g (x)].
B Comonotonicity and Covariance
For a set S and an algebra σ on S, let B (S,R) be the set of bounded σ-measurable functions
S 7→ R. Two random variables f, g ∈ B (S,R) are said to be comonotonic if
[f (x)− f (y)] [g (x)− g (y)] ≥ 0 ∀x,y ∈ S
and strictly comonotonic if this inequality is strict whenever x 6= y. The following result is
borrowed from Chateauneuf et al. [16]. I present the relevant for my argument “only if”
part of the proof.
Lemma B.1 Let f, g ∈ B (S,R). The following are equivalent.
f, g are (strictly) comonotonic.
Covpi [f, g] (>) ≥ 0 for any prob. measure pi on (S, σ).
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Proof. Let f, g ∈ B (S,R) be comonotonic and pi a probability measure on (S, σ). Then,
we have
2Covpi [f, g] = 2 (Epi [fg]− Epi [f ]Epi [g])
= 2
(∫
S
f (x) g (x) dpi (x)−
∫
S
f (y) dpi (y)
∫
S
g (x) dpi (x)
)
=
∫
S
f (x) g (x) dpi (x) +
∫
S
f (y) g (y) dpi (y)
−
∫
S
f (y) dpi (y)
∫
S
g (x) dpi (x)−
∫
S
f (x) dpi (x)
∫
S
g (y) dpi (y)
=
∫
S×S
[f (x)− f (y)] [g (x)− g (y)] dpi (x) dpi (y) ≥ 0
where the third equality is due to a change in the variables of integration. The validity of
the claim when the comonotonicity is strict is obvious.
Regarding the application of this result in the main text, notice that f and g need not be
bounded there. The boundedness condition guarantees that the integrals above exist for
any prob. measure pi on (S, σ). In the analysis of the asset-riskness effect, I fix ((ω, t) ,y) ∈
Ω×T ×RK−M and take g = Gn as well as f : RM 7→ R−− with f (z) = u′′ (W (I (ω, t) , z,y))
for z ∼ N (0, IM ). The relevant expectations are well-defined even though Gn (·) and u′′ (·)
are, respectively, not and not necessarily bounded. The strict comonotonicity between them
is due to non-increasing absolute risk aversion. This implies that u′′′ (·) > 0 and the result
follows since, other things being equal, the terminal wealth in (7) is strictly increasing in
the realization of the nth dividend.
C Proofs of the Results in the Text
This section presents the proofs for the various results in the paper. To keep notation
simple, whenever possible, I will only display the Brownian increment β (ω, T ) − β (ω, t)
part of the process I (ω, T ) in the relevant functional arguments. In addition, even though
not shown again for notational parsimony, all expectations are supposed to be conditional
on the current filtration Ft.
Proof of Proposition 1
By Claim 1 in Diasakos [23], for any (n,v) ∈ N \ {0} × RK , we have
P0 (I (ω, t))2
k∑
k=1
vk
∂pn (I (ω, t))
∂βk (ω, t)
(21)
= E(x,y)
[
f0
(
T, β (ω, t) +
√
T − tx) f0 (T, β (ω, t) +√T − ty)
v⊺ (x− y)Gn
(
T, β (ω, t) +
√
T − tx)
]
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where the functions Gn, f0 : I (ω, t) × RK 7→ R+ are given by Gn (·) = Gn (·) /G0 (·) and
f0 (·) = u′ (W (·))G0 (·).28
For any σ ∈ RK \ {0}, however, the family {H(ρ,σ) = {x ∈ RK : σ⊺x = ρ}}ρ∈R of hyper-
planes spans the space RK . Hence, given v ∈ RK \ {0}, we may write
H(0,v) = ∪ρ∈RH(ρ,σ) ∩H(0,v)
= ∪ρ∈R
{
x ∈ RK :
(
σ⊺x
v⊺x
)
=
(
ρ
0
)}
:= ∪ρ∈RH(σ,v)ρ
Consider, moreover, the line L (x˜,v) =
{
x ∈ RK : x = x˜+ rv, r ∈ R} passing through
x˜ ∈ H(0,v) and parallel to v (see Figure 1). Since v and H(0,v) are not collinear, we have29
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Figure 1: Spanning the space using v and σ
R
K = ∪x˜∈H(0,v)L (x˜,v) = ∪ρ∈R ∪x˜∈H(σ,v)ρ L (x˜,v)
For any x ∈ L (x˜,v), however, the fact x˜ ∈ H(σ,v)ρ ⊆ H(0,v) implies that v⊺x = v⊺x˜+rv⊺v =
rv⊺v while x⊺x = x˜⊺x˜+ r2v⊺v+2rx˜⊺v = x˜⊺x˜+ r2v⊺v. Hence, (21) gives (suppressing the
non-relevant functional arguments)
P 20
v⊺v
K∑
k=1
vk
∂pn (I (ω, t))
∂βk (ω, t)
=
∫
R2
S
(
ρ, ρ′
)
dρdρ′ (22)
with S : R2 7→ R given by
S
(
ρ, ρ′
)
=
∫
(
H
(σ,v)
ρ ×H
(σ,v)
ρ′
)
∩V0(ω,t)
2
∫
R2
(
r − r′)Gn (x˜+ rv)F0 (x˜, r)F0 (y˜, r) drdr′dx˜dy˜
28Regarding Claim 1 in [23], observe that, under the specification in (4), the set V0 (T, I (ω, t)) ={
x ∈ RK : G0
(
T, β (ω, t) +
√
T − tx) 6= 0} covers the entire space RK .
29Let {vk}K−1k=1 be a basis for H(0,v). As the hyperplane is not collinear with v, it follows that
{v,v1, . . . ,vK−1} is a basis of RK . That is, any x ∈ RK can be written uniquely as x = ∑K−1k=1 rkvk + rv
for some (r, r1, . . . , rK−1) ∈ RK . Equivalently, x = x˜+ rv for a unique x˜ = ∑K−1k=1 rkvk ∈ H(0,v).
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Figure 2: Spanning the space when v and σ are parallel
and, given I (ω, t), F0 : Rk+1 7→ R++ defined as
F0 (x˜, r) = (2pi)
−K/2 f0 (x˜+ rv) e
−
x˜
⊺
x˜+r2v⊺v
2
It should be noted, of course, that the above relation applies in general but for when σ and
v are collinear. In this case, the hyperplanes H(0,v), H(0,σ), and H
(σ,v)
0 all coincide (see
Figure 2) so that
R
K = ∪
x˜∈H
(σ,v)
0
L (x˜,v)
and, thus,
P 20
v⊺v
K∑
k=1
vk
∂pn (I (ω, t))
∂βk (ω, t)
= S (0, 0) (23)
=
∫
(H(0,σ)∩V0(ω,t))
2
∫
R2
(
r − r′)Gn (x˜+ rv)F0 (x˜, r)F0 (y˜, r) drdr′dx˜dy˜
Yet, the typical relative dividend is given as
Gn (I (ω, T )) = An (T ) eσ
⊺
nβ(ω,T ) n ∈ N \ {0}
where An (·) := An (·) /A0 (·). At any (ρ, ρ′) ∈ R2, therefore, we have
S (ρ, ρ′)
An (T ) eσ
⊺
nβ(ω,t)
=
∫
H
(σ,v)
ρ ×H
(σ,v)
ρ′
∫
R2
(
r − r′) eσ⊺n(x˜+rv)F0 (x˜, r)F0 (y˜, r) drdr′dx˜dy˜
= eρ
∫
H
(σ,v)
ρ ×H
(σ,v)
ρ′
∫
R2
(
r − r′) erσ⊺nvF0 (x˜, r)F0 (y˜, r) drdr′dx˜dy˜
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Let now v = (σnk − σ0k) ek. Since σ⊺nv = (σnk − σ0k)2, the last integrand above reads
e(σnk−σ0k)
2r (r − r′)F0 (x˜, r)F0 (y˜, r′). And as
e(σnk−σ0k)
2rr
(
r − r′)F0 (x˜, r)F0 (y˜, r′)+ e(σnk−σ0k)2r′r′ (r′ − r)F0 (y˜, r′)F0 (x˜, r)
=
(
e(σnk−σ0k)
2r − e(σnk−σ0k)2r′
) (
r − r′)F0 (x˜, r)F0 (y˜, r′)
is strictly positive everywhere on R2K ×R2 but for R2K × {(r, r′) ∈ R2 : r = r′}, a null-set,
Lemma A.1 implies that S (ρ, ρ′) > 0 ∀ (ρ, ρ′) ∈ R2. In either of the two possible cases
depicted by (22)-(23), the required result follows immediately from (21).
Proofs of Propositions 2-4
Letting v = ek in (21) gives
∂pn (I (ω, t))
∂βk (ω, t)
= E(x,y)
 u
′
(
T, β (ω, t) +
√
T − tx)u′ (T, β (ω, t) +√T − ty)
(yk − xk)
Gn
(
T, β (ω, t) +
√
T − ty)G0 (T, β (ω, t) +√T − tx)

Observe, however, that
E(x,y)
[
u′ (W (y))G0 (y) (yk − xk)u′ (W (x))G0 (x)
]
= 0
which, after renaming the variables yM ∈ RM , can be written also as
Ey
−(M,k)
[
E(zM ,yk)
[
u′ (W (y−M , zM ))G0 (y−M , zM )
Ex [(yk − xk)u′ (W (x))G0 (x)]
|y
−(M,k)
]]
= 0 (24)
Hence,
∂pn (I (ω, t))
∂βk (ω, t)
= E(x,y)
[
u′ (W (y))Gn (y) (yk − xk)u′ (W (x))G0 (x)
]
−Ey
−(M,k)
[
E(zM ,yk)
[
u′ (W (y−M , zM ))G0 (y−M , zM )
Ex [(yk − xk)u′ (W (x))G0 (x)]
|y
−(M,k)
]]
= Ey
−(M,k)
Eyk

(
EyM
[
u′ (W (y))Gn (y) |y−(M,k)
]
−EzM
[
u′ (W (y−M , zM ))G0 (y−M , zM ) |y−(M,k)
] )
Ex [(yk − xk)u′ (W (x))G0 (x) |yk]


= Ey
−(M,k)
Eyk

(
EyM [u
′(W (y))Gn(y)|y−(M,k)]
EzM [u
′(W (y−M ,zM ))G0(y−M ,zM )|y−(M,k)]
− 1
)
EzM
[
u′ (W (y−M , zM ))G0 (y−M , zM ) |y−(M,k)
]
Ex [(yk − xk)u′ (W (x))G0 (x) |yk]


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Recall, however, the dividend specification in (4). Clearly, the derivative of interest is
proportional to the quantity
δnk = Ey
−(M,k)
Eyk

(
e
√
T−tσ
⊺
ny−(M,k)EyM
[
u′(W (y))e
√
T−tσ
⊺
nyM |y
−(M,k)
]
e
√
T−tσ
⊺
0y−(M,k)EzM
[
u′(W (y−M ,zM ))e
√
T−tσ
⊺
0zM |y
−(M,k)
] − 1
)
EzM
[
u′ (W (y−M , zM ))G0 (y−M , zM ) |y−(M,k)
]
Ex [(yk − xk)u′ (W (x))G0 (x) |yk]


= Ey
−(M,k)
Eyk

(
e
√
T−t(σ⊺ny−(M,k)−σ
⊺
0z−(M,k))EyM
[
u′(W (y))e
√
T−tσ
⊺
nyM |y
−(M,k)
]
EzM
[
u′(W (y−M ,zM ))e
√
T−tσ
⊺
0zM |y
−(M,k)
] − 1
)
EzM
[
u′ (W (y−M , zM ))G0 (y−M , zM ) |y−(M,k)
]
Ex [(yk − xk)u′ (W (x))G0 (x) |yk]


the first equality using that σnk = 0 = σ0k.
30
Proposition 3
Fix an arbitrary point y
−(M,k) ∈ RK−M−1. I will show that the function g : R 7→ R given
by
g (yk) =
e
√
T−t(σ⊺ny−(M,k)−σ
⊺
0z−(M,k))EyM
[
u′ (W (y)) e
√
T−tσ⊺nyM |y
−(M,k)
]
EzM
[
u′ (W (y−M , zM )) e
√
T−tσ⊺0zM |y
−(M,k)
] − 1
is monotone under the conditions of the proposition. To this end, consider any yk ∈ R.
Clearly, g′ (yk) has the same sign as the quantity
I (yk) = E(yM ,zM )
 e
√
T−t
∑
m∈Kn
(σnmym+σ0mzm)(
u′′ (W (y))u′ (W (y−M , zM ))
∂W (y)
∂yk
−u′ (W (y))u′′ (W (y−M , zM )) ∂W (y−M ,zM )∂yk
)
|y
−(M,k)

= rAE(yM ,zM )
[
e
√
T−t
∑
m∈Kn
(σnmym+σ0mzm)
u′ (W (y))u′ (W (y−M , zM ))
(
∂W (y−M ,zM )
∂yk
− ∂W (y)∂yk
) |y
−(M,k)
]
Recall now the wealth specification in (18). We must have
∂W (y−M , zM )
∂yk
=
√
T − t
∑
n′∈Nk
σn′ke
µn′T+σn′β+
√
T−t
(∑
m∈Kn
σn′mzm+
∑
k′∈(Kn′ \Kn)∪{k}
σn′k′yk′
)
30In fact, σnk = σ0k is what we really need here. And one may well use the latter restriction to state
condition (i) of Proposition 3. For nothing would change in the proof that follows if we were to replace∑
m∈Kn
by
∑
m∈Kn\{k}
.
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where Kn ⊆ Kn′ , if σn′k 6= 0, is due to condition (ii). That is,
I (yk) =
√
T − trA
∑
n′∈Nk
 σn′keµn′T+σn′β+√T−t∑k′∈(Kn′ \Kn)∪{k} σn′k′yk′
E(yM ,zM )
[
u′ (W (y))u′ (W (y−M , zM ))hn′ (yM , zM ) |y−(M,k)
]

with hn′ : R
2M 7→ R defined by
hn′ (yM , zM ) = e
√
T−t
∑
m∈Kn
(σnmym+σ0mzm)(
e
√
T−t
∑
m∈Kn
σn′mzm − e
√
T−t
∑
m∈Kn
σn′mym
)
= e
√
T−t
∑
m∈Kn
σnmyme
√
T−t
∑
m∈Kn
σ0m(ym+zm)(
e
√
T−tλn′
∑
m∈Kn
σnmzm − e
√
T−tλn′
∑
m∈Kn
σnmym
)
the last equality due to condition (iii). Observe now that
hn′ (yM , zM ) + hn′ (zM ,yM )
= e
√
T−t
∑
m∈Kn
σ0m(ym+zm)(
e
√
T−t
∑
m∈Kn
σnmym − e
√
T−t
∑
m∈Kn
σnmzm
)
(
e
√
T−tλn′
∑
m∈Kn
σnmzm − e
√
T−tλn′
∑
m∈Kn
σnmym
)
Clearly, λn′ > 0 for the typical n
′ ∈ NM implies hn′ (yM , zM ) + hn′ (zM ,yM ) ≤ 0 on R2M ,
with equality only on the zero-measure subset
{
(yM , zM ) ∈ R2M :
∑
m∈Kn
σnk′ (yk′ − zk′) = 0
}
.
In this case, Lemma A.1 ensures that the corresponding expectation in the sum of I (yk) is
negative.31 By contrast, it is positive if λn′ < 0. It follows then that the typical term in
the sum of I (yk) has the opposite sign from the quantity λn′σn′k. To sign I (yk), therefore,
it suffices that the latter quantity maintains the same sign across NM . This is guaranteed
by condition (iv) while condition (ii), by implying that NM ⊆ Nk, ensures it as meaningful
statement.
Next, define the function g∗ : R 7→ R by
g∗ (yk) = EzM
[
u′ (W (y−M , zM ))G0 (y−M , zM )
]
Ex
[
(yk − xk)u′ (W (x))G0 (x)
]
Since u′ (·) > 0, by Lemma A.3, there exists some y∗k ∈ R with (yk − y∗k) g∗ (yk) > 0
∀yk ∈ R \ {y∗k}. Let now λn′σn′k > 0 for the typical n′ ∈ NM ∩ Nk. Since λn′σn′kg (·) is
31To use the lemma here, let g := hn′ and define f : R
2M 7→ R++ by f (yM , zM ) =
u′ (W (y))u′ (W (y−M , zM )) e
−
yMyM+zM zM
2 .
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strictly decreasing on R, we have
Eyk [λn′σn′kg (yk) g
∗ (yk)]
<
∫ y0k
−∞
λn′σn′kg (y
∗
k) g
∗ (yk) dΦ (yk) +
∫ +∞
y∗
k
λn′σn′kg (y
∗
k) g
∗ (yk) dΦ (yk)
= λn′σn′kg (y
∗
k)Eyk [g
∗ (yk)]
and, thus,
λn′σn′kδnk = Ey
−(M,k)
[Eyk [λn′σn′kg (yk) g
∗ (yk)]]
< λn′σn′kg (y
∗
k)Ey−(M,k) [Eyk [g
∗ (yk)]] = 0
the last equality following from (24). The claim now follows immediately from the definition
of λn′ .
Proposition 4
Observe first that nothing in the preceding proof would change if the restriction σnk =
0 = σ0k were to be relaxed to σnk = σ0k. Consider now the terminal wealth specification
W (x) = W1 (xL) + W2 (x−L) for some continuous functions W1 : R
L 7→ R++ and W2 :
R
K−L 7→ R++. As long as Kn ∩ ∪n′∈NkKn′ = ∅, it is without loss of generality to take
xM and xk as the projections of xL and x−L on R
M and R (along the kth dimension),
respectively. But then
∂W (y)
∂yk
=
∂W2 (y−L)
∂yk
=
∂W (y−L, zL)
∂yk
and proceeding as before results in I (·) being the zero function on R. That is, g (·) is a
constant function and, by Lemma A.1, δnk = 0.
Proposition 2
This proof proceeds in the same fashion as that of Proposition 3. Fixing an arbitrary
y
−(M,k) ∈ RK−M−1, we have now
I (yk) = E(yM ,zM )
[
u′ (W (y))u′ (W (y−M , zM )) e
√
T−t
∑
m∈Kn
(σnmym+σ0mzm)[
rA (W (y−M , zM ))
∂W (y−M ,zM )
∂yk
− rA (W (y)) ∂W (y)∂yk
] ]
Under (14), moreover, we have
∂W (y)
∂yk
=
√
T − t
∑
n′′∈Nk
σn′′ke
µn′′T+σ
⊺
n′′
β+
√
T−t
∑
k′∈K\Kn
σn′′k′yk′
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or
I (yk)√
T − t = E(yM ,zM )
[
u′ (W (y))u′ (W (y−M , zM ))h (y−M , zM )
]
∑
n′′∈Nk
σn′′ke
µn′′T+σ
⊺
n′′
β+
√
T−t
∑
k′∈K\Kn
σn′′k′yk′
with h : RK+M 7→ R given by
h (y−M , (yM , zM )) = e
√
T−t
∑
m∈Kn
σ0m(ym+zm)
[rA (W (y−M , zM ))− rA (W (y))] e
√
T−t
∑
m∈Kn
σnmym
Recall now condition (iii). As before, we may deploy the notationNM =
{
n′ ∈ N : σn′m 6= 0 ∀m ∈ Kn
}
.
Here, however, condition (ii) implies that NM ∩Nk = ∅ and the wealth specification in (14)
may be written also as follows
W (y) = ρ
(
y
−(M,k)
)
+W1 (y−M )
+
∑
n′∈NM
e
√
T−tλn′σ
⊺
nyM eµn′T+σ
⊺
n′
β+
√
T−t
∑
k′∈K\(Kn∪{k})
σn′k′yk′
Obviously, letting λn′ > 0 for the typical n
′ ∈ NM , we ought to have ∂W (y) /∂e
√
T−t
∑
m∈Kn
σnmym >
0. And, under DARA, ∂rA (W (y)) /∂e
√
T−t
∑
m∈Kn
σmym < 0. But then
h (y−M , (yM , zM )) + h (y−M , (zM ,yM ))
= e
√
T−t
∑
m∈Kn
σ0m(ym+zm)
[rA (W (y−M , zM ))− rA (W (y))]
(
e
√
T−t
∑
m∈Kn
σnmym − e
√
T−t
∑
m∈Kn
σnmzm
)
is non-negative on R2M , being zero only on the zero-measure set consisting of the vectors
(yM , zM ) :
∑
m∈Kn
σnm (ym − zm) = 0. By Lemma A.1, then, the last expectation above
is positive and, thus, condition (iv) ensures that I (yk) has the same sign as σn′′k for the
typical n′′ ∈ Nk. By the same argument now as in the last part of the proof of Proposition 3,
since σn′′kg (·) is strictly increasing on R, it cannot but be σn′′kδnk > 0. Equally obviously,
it must be σn′′kδnk < 0 when λn′ < 0 for the typical n
′ ∈ NM .
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